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Class                   ^ 

60TH    C0NGRE8S 

1st  Session 


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SENATE. 


Document 
No.  461. 


IN  BEHALF  OF  THE  ARCHITECT  OF 
OUR  FEDERAL  CONSTITUTION 


r*v-2. 


Pelatiah  Webster 

of  Philadelphia,  Pa. 


Hann\a"TayVo' 


Presented  by  Mr.  Carter,  May  4,  1908. — Ordered  to  be  printed. 


*&.« 


t^v 


Author's  Note. 

Herein  is  reprinted,  for  the  first  time  in  116  years, 
the  epoch-making  paper  published  by  Pelatiah  Webster 
at  Philadelphia,  February  16th,  1783,  and  there  repub- 
lished with  notes  in  1791,  in  which  he  announced  to  the 
world,  as  his  invention,  the  entire  plan  of  the  existing 
Constitution  of  the  United  States,  worked  out  in  detail 
more  than  four  years  before  the  Federal  Convention  of 
1787  met. 

HANNIS  TAYLOR. 


173 


WT 


/\  *v\ 


To  the  Congress  of  the  United  States: 

The  purpose  of  this  memorial  is  twofold:  First,  to  place 
in  the  hands  of  Congress  the  data  for  a  new  and  pivotal 
chapter  in  the  history  of  the  Constitution  that  will  impress 
upon  succeeding  generations  the  all-important  fact  that 
every  basic  principle  which  differentiates  our  existing 
Federal  system  from  all  that  have  preceded  it  was  a  part  of 
a  single  invention  struck  off  at  a  given  time  by  the  brain 
and  purpose  of  one  man;  second,  to  press  upon  Congress 
the  long  neglected  duty  of  honoring,  by  an  appropriate 
monument,  the  memory  of  an  American  statesman  and 
patriot  who  has  made  a  larger  personal  contribution  to  the 
science  of  government  than  any  other  one  individual  in  the 
history  of  mankind.  From  the  data  thus  presented  it  clearly 
appears  that  among  our  nation  builders  Pelatiah  Webster 
stands  second  to  Washington  alone.  All  the  world  under- 
stands in  a  vague  and  general  way  that  certain  path-breaking 
principles  entered  into  the  structure  of  our  second  Federal 
Constitution  of  1789  which  differentiate  it  from  all  other 
systems  of  federal  government  that  have  preceded  it. 
M.  de  Tocqueville  gave  formal  expression  to  that  under- 
standing when  he  said:  "This  Constitution,  which  may  at 
first  be  confounded  with  federal  constitutions  that  have 
preceded  it,  rests  in  truth  upon  a  wholly  novel  theory  which 
may  be  considered  a  great  discovery  in  modern  political 
science.  In  the  confederations  that  preceded  the  American 
Constitution  of  1789,  the  allied  states,  for  a  common  object, 
agreed  to  obey  the  injunctions  of  a  federal  government;  but 
they  reserved  to  themselves  the  right  of  ordaining  and 
enforcing  the  execution  of  the  laws  of  the  Union.  The 
American  States,  which  combined  in  1789,  agreed  that  the 
federal   government   should   not   only   dictate,    but   should 

(5) 


execute  its  own  enactments.  In  both  cases  the  right  is  the 
same,  but  the  exercise  of  the  right  is  different;  and  this 
difference  produced  the  most  momentous  consequences."* 
Mr.  Gladstone  simply  reiterated  that  idea  when  he  said: 
"As  the  British  Constitution  is  the  most  subtile  organism 
which  has  proceeded  from  progressive  history,  so  the 
American  Constitution  is  the  most  wonderful  work  ever 
struck  off  at  a  given  time  by  the  brain  and  purpose  of  man." 
That  master  of  the  history  of  English  institutions  perfectly 
understood  that  as  our  state  constitutions  are  mere  repro- 
ductions, mere  evolutions  from  the  English  political  system, 
so  our  second  federal  constitution  is  a  new  invention  "struck 
off  at  a  given  time  by  the  brain  and  purpose  of  man." 

That  invention  of  a  new  type  of  federal  government, 
embodying,  as  Tocqueville  said,  "  a  wholly  novel  theory," 
is  so  unique  that  it  can  no  more  be  confounded  with  any 
preceding  federal  government  than  a  modern  mogul  engine 
can  be  confounded  with  an  ancient  stage  coach.  Did  that 
wonderful  invention,  which  has  produced  such  momentous 
consequences,  have  a  personal  author,  like  all  other  inven- 
tions ;  or  was  it  revealed  at  the  same  moment,  and  in  some 
mysterious  way,  to  a  large  number  of  persons,  thinking  and 
acting  in  isolation?  Upon  that  humanely  impossible  or 
miraculous  theory  historians  of  our  existing  constitution 
have  attempted  to  explain  the  origin  of  the  unique  and  pre- 
arranged plan  of  federal  government  presented  to  the  Con- 
vention which  sat  at  Philadelphia  during  the  125  days  that 
intervened  between  May  14  and  September  17,  1787.  After 
deducting  recesses  and  holidays,  there  could  not  have  been 
more  than  90  working  days.  No  one  has  ever  contended,  or 
can  ever  contend,  that  the  great  invention  in  question  was 
made  after  the  Convention  met,  for  the  simple  and  conclusive 
reason  that  it  was  the  basis  of  all  the  "plans"  save  one, 
carefully  constructed  beforehand,  out  of  which  the  Con- 
stitution  was   evolved.      Five   and   only   five  "plans,"   all 

*  Democracy  in  America,  vol.  i,  pp.  198,  199. 


prearranged,  were  submitted  to  trie  Convention,  viz,  the 
Virginia  plan,  the  Charles  Pinckney  plan,  the  Connecticut 
plan,  the  Alexander  Hamilton  plan,  and  the  New  Jersey- 
plan.  As  the  last  only  proposed  a  revision  of  the  Articles 
of  Confederation  it  may  be  dismissed  from  consideration. 
There  were  but  four  plans  in  which  proposals  for  a  ne-w 
system  of  federal  government  were  embodied,  each  resting 
upon  the  "wholly  novel  theory"  which  has  produced  "the 
most  momentous  consequences." 

A  distinguished  specialist  has  well  said  that  "the  Virginia 
plan  became  the  rock-bed  of  the  Constitution.*  That  plan, 
which  embodied  perfectly  every  phase  of  the  great  invention, 
was  drafted  by  Madison,  who  began  his  preparation  for  the 
labors  of  the  Convention  at  least  a  year  before  it  met.f 
In  December,  1786,  we  find  him  in  active  correspondence 
with  Jefferson,  then  at  Paris,  as  to  the  Virginia  plan. J 
The  marvel  is  that  the  historians  who  are  supposed  to  have 
explored  the  sources  have  never  taken  the  pains  to  ask  this 
simple  and  inevitable  question — From  what  common  source 
did  the  draftsmen  of  the  four  plans  draw  the  path-breaking 
invention  which  was  the  foundation  of  all  of  them?  Let  it  be 
said  to  the  honor  of  those  draftsmen  that  no  one  of  them 
ever  claimed  to  be  the  author  of  that  invention.  Neither 
Madison,  nor  Charles  Pinckney,  nor  Sherman,  nor  Ellsworth, 
nor  Hamilton,  nor  any  of  their  biographers,  so  far  as  the 
writer  is  informed,  ever  set  up  such  a  claim  in  behalf  of  any 
one  of  them.  The  answer  to  "the  simple  and  inevitable 
question  "  just  propounded  is  this :  The  common  source  from 
which  the  draftsmen  of  the  four  plans  drew  the  path-breaking 
invention  underlying  them  all  was  "A  Dissertation  on  the 
Political  Union  and  Constitution  of  the  thirteen  United 
States  of  North  America,"  published   at   Philadelphia  by 

*  Meigs,  The  Growth  of  the  Constitution  in  the  Federal  Convention  0/1787,  p.  17. 

|See  Rives'  Life  and  Times  of  Madison,  vol.  ii,  p.  208,  "Preparations  of  Madison 
for  labors  of  Federal  Convention." 

J  See  letter  of  Jefferson  to  Madison  of  December  16,  1786,  in  fefferson' s  Corre- 
spondence, by  T.  J.  Randolph,  vol.  ii,  pp.  64,  65. 


8 

Pelatiah  Webster,  February  16,  1783,  and  there  republished 
by  him  with  copious  notes  in  1791,  and  herein  reproduced 
for  the  first  time  after  the  lapse  of  116  years.  In  that 
immortal  paper,  whose  lightest  words  are  weighty,  he  gave 
to  the  world,  as  his  personal  contribution  to  the  science  of 
government,  and  as  an  entirety  worked  out  in  great  detail  the 
"wholly  novel  theory"  of  federal  government  upon  which 
reposes  the  existing  Constitution  of  the  United  States. 

Prior  to  the  date  in  question  no  single  element  of  that 
theory  had  ever  been  propounded  by  anyone.  In  a  note 
appended  to  the  republication  of  1791  the  great  inventor 
gives  the  following  account  of  the  circumstances  under 
which  the  invention  was  made :  "At  the  time  when  this 
Dissertation  was  written  (February  16,  1783)  the  defects  and 
insufficiency  of  the  Old  Federal  Constitution  were  universally 
felt  and  acknowledged;  it  was  manifest,  not  only  that  the 
internal  police,  justice,  security,  and  peace  of  the  States 
could  never  be  preserved  under  it,  but  the  finances  and 
public  credit  would  necessarily  become  so  embarrassed, 
precarious,  and  void  of  support,  that  no  public  movement, 
which  depended  on  the  revenue,  could  be  managed  with  any 
effectual  certainty :  but  tho'  the  public  mind  was  under  full 
conviction  of  all  these  mischiefs,  and  was  contemplating  a 

remedy,  YET  THE  PUBLIC  IDEAS  WERE  NOT  AT  ALL  CONCEN- 
TRATED, MUCH  LESS  ARRANGED  INTO  ANY  NEW  SYSTEM  OR 
form  OF  GOVERNMENT,  which  would  obviate  these  evils. 
Under  these  circumstances,  I  offered  this  Dissertation  to  the 
public:  how  far  the  principles  of  it  were  adopted  or  rejected 
in  the  New  Constitution,  which  was  four  years  afterwards 
(Sept.  17,  1787)  formed  by  the  General  Convention,  and  since 
ratified  by  all  the  States,  is  obvious  to  every  one." 

At  the  same  time  he  added:  "I  was  fully  of  opinion  (tho' 
the  sentiment  at  that  time  would  not  very  well  bear)  that  it 
would  be  ten  times  easier  to  form  a  new  Constitution  than 
to  mend  the  old  one.  I  therefore  sat  myself  down  to  sketch 
out  the  leading  principles  of  that  political  Constitution,  which 


I  thought  necessary  to  the  preservation  and  happiness  of 
the  United  States  of  America,  which  are  comprised  in  this 
Dissertation.  I  hope  the  reader  will  please  to  consider  that 
these  are  the  original  thoughts  of  a  private  individual,  dic- 
tated by  the  nature  of  the  subject  only,  long  before  the 
important  theme  became  the  great  object  of  discussion  in 
the  most  dignified  and  important  assembly  which  ever  sat  or 
decided  in  America."  The  great  inventor  perfectly  under- 
stood the  merits  of  his  own  case  which  he  thus  stated  with 
the  lucidity  of  a  Greek  and  the  terseness  of  a  Roman.  As 
early  as  1781  Pelatiah  Webster  was  the  first  to  propose  to  the 
people  of  the  United  States,  in  one  of  his  financial  essays 
published  at  Philadelphia  in  May  of  that  year,  the  calling 
of  "a  Continental  Convention"  for  the  making  of  a  new 
Constitution.*  In  bearing  testimony  to  that  fact,  Madison 
said  that  Pelatiah  Webster,  "after  discussing  the  fiscal 
system  of  the  United  States,  and  suggesting,  among  other 
remedial  provisions,  one  including  a  national  bank,  remarks, 
that  'the  authority  of  Congress  is  very  inadequate  to  the 
performance  of  their  duties ;  and  this  indicates  the  necessity 
of  their  calling  a  Continental  Convention  for  the  express 
purpose  of  ascertaining,  defining,  enlarging,  and  limiting 
the  duties  and  powers  of  their  Constitution.'  "f  Two  years 
after  he  had  thus  sounded  the  tocsin  for  the  States  to  assem- 
ble he  made  the  invention  and  published  to  the  world,  in 
detail,  the  plan  upon  which  the  Constitution  was  to  be 
formed.  While  the  historian  Bancroft  %  failed  to  appreciate 
the  stupendous  importance  of  his  work,  he  frankly  admits 
that  he  actually  performed  it  when  he  says :  "  The  public 
mind  was  ripening  for  a  transition  from  a  confederation  to 
a  real  government.     Just  at  this  time  Pelatiah  Webster,  a 

*The  fact  that  "Alexander  Hamilton  made  the  same  suggestion  in  a  private 
letter  to  James  Duane,  September  3,  1780,"  is  of  no  importance.  It  was  not  a 
public  act,  not  even  a  public  declaration.  See  Gaillard  Hunt's  "L,ifeof  James 
Madison,"  p.  108. 

tThe  Madison  Papers  (1841),  vol.  ii,  pp.  706-7. 

%  History  of  the  Constitution  of  the  United  States,  vol.  i,  p.  86. 


IO 

graduate  of  Yale  College,  in  a  dissertation  published  at 
Philadelphia,  proposed  for  the  legislature  of  the  United 
States  a  congress  of  two  houses  which  should  have  ample 
authority  for  making  laws  'of  general  necessity  and  utility,' 
and  enforcing  them  as  well  on  individuals  as  on  States.  He 
further  suggested  not  only  heads  of  executive  departments, 
but  judges  of  law  and  chancery.  The  tract  awakened  so 
much  attention  that  it  was  reprinted  in  Hartford,  and  called 
forth  a  reply."*  In  both  of  the  scanty  and  stingy  biograph- 
ical notices  of  him  in  the  leading  American  encyclopaedias, 
the  statement  is  made  that  his  plan  "is  mentioned  by  James 
Madison  as  having  an  influence  in  directing  the  public  mind 
to  the  necessity  of  a  better  form  of  government."  Pelatiah 
Webster  needs  the  admissions  neither  of  Madison  nor  Ban- 
croft to  establish  his  title  to  the  authorship  of  the  "wholly 
novel  theory"  now  embodied  in  the  Constitution  of  the 
United  States,  because  that  title  rests  upon  contemporary 
documentary  evidence  as  clear  and  convincing  as  that  upon 
which  rests  Jefferson's  title  to  the  authorship  of  the  Declara- 
tion of  Independence.  If  that  be  true,  then  he  has  made  a 
larger  personal  contribution  to  the  science  of  government 
than  any  other  one  individual  in  the  history  of  mankind. 
Among  our  nation-builders  he  stands  second  to  Washington 
alone. 

And  yet  among  them  all  he  only  has  been  neglected  and 
forgotten  by  his  countrymen,  not  through  any  conscious 
omission,  but  because  of  a  careless  historical  scholarship 
which  has  failed  to  present  his  great  achievement  in  its  true 
light.  That  conviction  has  impelled  the  undersigned — who 
has  devoted  more  than  thirty  years  to  the  special  study  of 
the  origin  and  growth  of  our  constitutional  systems,  State 
and  Federal — to  present  to  the  Congress  herein,  very  briefly, 
the  historical  data  upon  which  Pelatiah  Webster's  right  to 
immortality  depends.  He  it  was  who  first  suggested  the 
separate  existence  of  the  two  Houses  of  Congress,  when,  in 

*It  was  replied  to  anonymously  by  Roger  Sherman. 


II 

1783,  he  said,  "That  the  Congress  shall  consist  of  two  Cham- 
bers, an  Upper  and  Lower  House,  or  Senate  and  Commons, 
with  the  concurrence  of  both  necessary  to  every  act;  and 
that  every  State  send  one  or  more  delegates  to  each  House: 
this  will  subject  every  act  to  two  discussions  before  two 
distinct  chambers  of  men  equally  qualified  for  the  debate, 
equally  masters  of  the  subject,  and  of  equal  authority  in  the 
decision."  * 

Prior  to  that  utterance  no  Federal  Assembly,  ancient  or 
modern,  had  ever  consisted  of  two  chambers;  no  one  had 
ever  suggested  such  an  idea.  If  after  a  careful  examination 
of  all  the  facts  the  Congress  shall  deem  the  architect  of  our 
Federal  Constitution  unworthy  of  a  monument,  the  under- 
signed prays  in  his  behalf  that  this  humble  memorial  may 
be  embodied  in  its  records  so  that  succeeding  generations 
may  determine  for  themselves  whether  or  no  his  work  has 
been  justly  judged. 

I. 

FEDERAL  GOVERNMENTS  PRIOR  TO  AND  INCLUDING  THAT 

OF  1776. 

From  the  days  of  the  Greek  Leagues  down  to  the  making 
of  the  second  constitution  of  the  United  States,  all  federal 
governments  had  been  constructed  on  a  single  plan  at  once 
clumsy  and  inefficient.  The  most  perfect  of  the  Greek 
Leagues  was  the  Achaian,  of  which  the  framers  really  knew 
nothing,  as  we  learn  from  Madison  who  tells  us  in  the  Feder- 
alist (xviii)  that  "could  the  interior  structure  and  regular 
operation  of  the  Achaian  League  be  ascertained,  it  is  probable 
that  more  light  might  be  thrown  by  it  on  the  science  of 
federal  government  than  by  any  like  experiments  with  which 
we  are  acquainted."  The  coveted  knowledge  was  not  acces- 
sible because  the  historical  scholars  who  have  since  passed 
beyond  the  Greece  of  Thucydides  into  the  Greece  of  Polybios, 
who  have  passed  beyond  the  period  in  which  the  independent 

*The  italics  in  all  the  quotations  from  Pelatiah  Webster's  paper  are  his  own. 


12 

city-commonwealth  was  the  dominant  political  idea  into  the 
later  and  less  brilliant  period  of  Hellenic  freedom  occupied 
by  the  history  of  Greek  frederalism,  had  not  then  completed 
their  investigations,  only  fully  worked  out  in  very  recent 
years.*  Such  scanty  knowledge  as  the  framers  did  possess 
of  Greek  federalism  seems  to  have  been  chiefly  drawn  from 
the  little  work  of  the  Abbe  Mably,  Observations  sur  PHis- 
toire  de  Grece  (Federalist,  xviii).  The  only  federal  govern- 
ments with  whose  internal  organizations  the  builders  of  our 
Federal  Republic  were  really  familiar,  and  whose  histories 
had  any  practical  effect  upon  their  work,  were  those  that  had 
grown  up  between  the  Low-Dutch  communities  at  the 
mouth  of  the  Rhine,  and  between  the  High-Dutch  communi- 
ties in  the  mountains  of  Switzerland,  and  upon  the  plains  of 
Germany  (Federalist,  xix,  xx).  Down  to  the  making  of  the 
second  constitution  of  the  United  States,  the  Confederation 
of  Swiss  Cantons,  the  United  Provinces  of  the  Netherlands, 
and  the  German  Confederation  really  represented  the  total 
advance  made  by  the  modern  world  in  the  structure  of  federal 
governments. 

Such  advance  was  embodied  in  the  idea  of  a  federal  system 
made  up  of  a  union  of  states,  cities  or  districts,  representa- 
tives from  which  composed  a  single  federal  assembly  whose 
limited  powers  could  be  brought  to  bear,  not  upon  individual 
citizens,  but  only  upon  cities  or  states  as  such.  The  funda- 
mental principle  upon  which  all  such  fabrics  rested  was  the 
requisition  system,  under  which  the  federal  assembly  was 
only  endowed  with  the  power  to  make  requisitions  for  men 
and  money  upon  the  states  or  cities  composing  the  league 
for  federal  purposes,  while  the  states,  alone,  in  their  corporate 
capacity  possessed  the  power  to  execute  them.  The  initial 
effort  of  the  English  colonies  in  America  along  the  path 
of  federal  union  ended  with  the  making  of  the  first  consti- 
tution of   the  United  States  embodied   in  the  Articles  of 

*The  first  volume  (History  of  Greek  Federations)  of  Edward  A.  Freeman's  great 
History  of  Federal  Government  was  not  published  until  1863. 


*3 

Confederation.  Up  to  that  point  nothing  new  had  been 
achieved;  the  fruit  of  the  first  effort  was  simply  a  confedera- 
tion, constructed  upon  a  plan  over  two  thousand  years  old, 
which  could  only  deal  through  the  requisition  system  with 
states  as  states.  That  confederation  possessed  no  power 
(i)  to  operate  directly  upon  the  individual  citizen;  (2)  it 
had  no  independent  power  of  taxation;  (3)  the  federal 
head  was  not  divided  into  three  departments — executive, 
legislative,  and  judicial;  (4)  the  federal  assembly  consisted 
of  one  chamber  instead  of  two.*  The  lack  of  power  to  levy 
and  collect  for  itself  federal  or  national  taxes  rendered  our 
first  Federal  Government  preeminently  a  failure  as  a  finan- 
cial system,  dependent  as  it  was  upon  the  will  of  thirteen 
independent  legislatures. 

II. 

PELATIAH   WEBSTER'S   INVENTION   AND  THE   SECOND 
FEDERAL  CONSTITUTION   OF    1787. 

The  most  scientific  writer  upon  finance  during  the  Revo- 
lutionary War  was  Pelatiah  Webster,  whose  essays  on  that 
subject  fill  a  volume.f  He  was  born  at  Lebanon,  Connecticut, 
in  1725,  and  graduated  at  Yale  College  in  1746.  In  1755 
he  removed  to  Philadelphia,  where  he  became  a  prosperous 
merchant,  and  in  due  time  an  ardent  supporter  of  the 
patriot  cause  in  the  War  of  the  Revolution,  aiding  with 
pen  and  purse.  He  was  captured  by  the  British,  and,  on 
account  of  his  ardor  was  imprisoned  for  four  months.  As 
early  as  October,  1776,  he  began  to  write  on  the  currency, 
and  in  1779  he  commenced  the  publication  at  Philadelphia 
of  a  series  of  "  Essays  on  Free  Trade  and  Finance."  He  was 
sufficiently  important  as  a  political  economist  to  be  con- 
sulted by  the  Continental  Congress  as  to  the  resources  of 
the  country.     His  financial  studies  soon  convinced  him  that 

*  See  Pelatiah  Webster's  masterful  analysis  of  the  first  Constitution  contained  in 
his  Notes  published  in  1791,  infra,  p.  48. 

fThe  second  edition  of  1791  was  "Printed  and  sold  by  Joseph  Crukshank, 
No.  91,  High  Street,"  Philadelphia. 


no  stable  fiscal  system  could  be  established  until  the  then 
existing  federal  government  was  wiped  out  and  superseded 
by  one  endowed  with  independent  taxing  power.  There- 
fore, as  early  as  1 781,  in  one  of  his  financial  essays,  he  made 
the  first  public  call  for  the  "Continental  Convention," 
referred  to  by  Madison,  to  be  armed  with  power  to  devise 
an  adequate  system  of  federal  government.  Having  thus 
taken  the  first  step,  he  set  himself  to  work  to  formulate  in 
advance  such  an  adequate  system  as  the  Convention  should 
adopt,  whenever  it  might  meet.  In  the  great  tract  published 
at  Philadelphia,  February  16,  1783,  we  have  photographed 
for  us  the  workings  of  his  mind  as  he  moved  along  paths 
never  trod  before.  He  sounded  the  keynote  when  he 
declared:  "They  (the  supreme  power)  must  therefore  of 
necessity  be  vested  with  a  power  of  taxation.  I  know  this  is 
a  most  important  and  weighty  truth,  a  dreadful  engine  of 
oppression,  tyranny,  and  injury,  when  ill  used;  yet,  from  the 
necessity  of  the  case,  it  must  be  admitted. 

"For  to  give  a  supreme  authority  a  power  of  making  con- 
tracts,  without  any  power  of  payment ;  of  appointing  officers, 
civil  and  militar}^,  without  money  to  pay  them;  power  to  build 
ships,  without  any  money  to  do  it  with;  a  power  of  emitting 
money,  without  any  power  to  redeem  it;  or  of  borrowing 
money,  without  any  power  to  make  payment,  etc. — such 
solecisms  in  government  are  so  nugatory  and  absurd  that 
I  really  think  to  offer  further  argument  on  the  subject  would 
be  to  insult  the  understanding  of  my  readers.  To  make  all 
these  payments  dependent  on  the  votes  of  thirteen  popular 
assemblies,  who  will  undertake  to  judge  of  the  propriety  of 
every  contract  and  every  occasion  of  money,  and  grant  or 
withhold  supplies  according  to  their  opinion,  whilst  at  the 
same  time  the  operation  of  the  whole  may  be  stopped  by  the 
vote  of  a  single  one  of  them,  is  absurd."  Thus  Pelatiah 
Webster  proposed  the  existing  system  of  federal  taxation, 
then  entirely  new,  to  the  world;  thus  he  proposed  that  the 
ancient  system  of  requisitions,  resting  on  the  taxing  power 


J5 

of  the  states,  should  be  superseded  by  a  system  of  federal  or 
national  taxation  extending  to  every  citizen,  directly  or  indi- 
rectly. Instead  of  the  lifeless  system  of  absurdity  embodied 
in  the  Articles  of  Confederation,  he  proposed  to  substitute  a 
self-executing  and  self-sustaining  national  system,  based  on 
the  following  propositions,  stated  in  his  own  language :  "  The 
supreme  authority  of  any  State  must  have  power  enough  to 
affect  the  ends  of  its  appointment,  otherwise  these  ends  cannot 
be  answered  and  effectually  secured.  *  *  *  I  begin  with 
my  first  and  great  principle,  viz,  That  the  Constitution  must 
vest  powers  in  every  department  sufficient  to  secure  aud  make 
effectual  the  ends  of  it.  The  supreme  authority  must  have 
the  power  of  making  war  and  peace — of  appointing  armies 
and  navies — of  appointing  officers  both  civil  and  military — 
of  making  co?itracts — of  emitting,  coining,  and  borrowing 
money — of  regulating  trade — of  making  treaties  with  foreign 
powers — of  establishing  post-offices — and,  in  short,  of  doing 
everything  which  the  well-being  of  the  Commonwealth  may 
require,  and  which  is  not  compatable  to  any  particular  State, 
all  of  which  require  money,  and  cannot  possibly  be  made 
effectual  without  it.  *  *  *  This  tax  can  be  laid  by  the 
supreme  authority  much  more  conveniently  than  by  the 
particular  Assemblies,  and  would  in  no  case  be  subject  to 
their  repeals  or  modifications ;  and  of  course  the  public  credit 
would  never  be  dependent  on,  or  liable  to  bankruptcy  by  the 
humors  of,  any  particular  assembly.  *  *  •  The  dele- 
gates which  are  to  form  that  august  body,  which  are  to  hold 
and  exercise  the  supreme  authority,  ought  to  be  appointed 
by  the  States  in  any  manner  they  please."  In  formulating 
his  conclusions  as  to  the  supremacy  of  federal  law  acting 
directly  on  all  citizens,  he  said:  "(i)  No  laws  of  any  State 
whatever  which  do  not  carry  in  them  a  force  which  extends 
to  their  effectual  and  final  execution  can  afford  a  certain  or 
sufficient  security  to  the  subject — this  is  too  plain  to  need 
proof;  (2)  Laws  or  ordinances  of  any  kind  (especially  of 
august  bodies  of  high  dignity  and  consequence),  which  fail 


i6 

of  execution,  are  much  worse  than  none ;  they  weaken  the 
government;  expose  it  to  contempt.  *  *  *  A  govern- 
ment which  is  bnt  half  executed,  or  whose  operations  may 
all  be  stopped  by  a  single  vote,  is  the  most  dangerous  of  all 
institutions.     *     *     * 

"  Further,  I  propose  that  if  the  execution  of  any  act  or  order 
of  the  supreme  authority  shall  be  opposed  by  force  in  any  of 
the  States  (which  God  forbid !)  it  shall  be  lawful  for  Congress 
to  send  into  such  State  a  sufficient  force  to  suppress  it.  On 
the  whole,  I  take  it  that  the  very  existence  and  use  of  our 
union  effectually  depends  on  the  full  energy  and  final  effect 
of  the  laws  made  to  support  it ;  and  therefore  I  sacrifice  all 
other  considerations  to  this  energy  and  effect ;  and  if  our  Union 
is  not  worth  this  purchase  we  must  give  it  up — the  nature 
of  the  thing  does  not  admit  any  other  alternative."  In  these 
ringing  terms  was  announced  the  path-breaking  invention 
of  a  supreme  and  self-executing  federal  government  oper- 
ating directly  upon  the  citizen ;  an  invention  for  which  the 
world  had  been  waiting  for  two  thousand  years ;  an  inven- 
tion of  which  no  trace  or  hint  is  to  be  found  in  the  constitutions 
of  any  of  the  Teutonic  Leagues,  in  the  Articles  of  Confedera- 
tion, or  in  the  prior  utterance  of  any  other  man. 

Having  thus  defined  his  fundamental  concept  of  a  federal 
government  operating  directly  on  the  citizen,  the  great  one 
boldly  accepted  the  inevitable  corollary  that  such  a  govern- 
ment must  be  strictly  organized  and  equipped  with  machin- 
ery adequate  to  its  ends — with  the  usual  branches,  executive, 
legislative,  and  judicial;  with  its  army,  its  navy,  its  civil 
service,  and  all  the  usual  apparatus  of  a  government,  all 
bearing  directly  upon  every  citizen  of  the  Union  without 
any  reference  to  the  government  of  the  several  States.  No 
such  federal  government,  ancient  or  modern,  had  ever  existed. 
As  Montesquieu  was  the  first  to  point  out,  the  division  of 
state  powers  into  executive,  legislative,  and  judicial,  origi- 
nated in   that   single  state  in  Britain  we  call  England.* 

*  Spirit  of  Laws,  bk.  xi,  ch.  6. 


*7 

From  that  single  state  the  principle  passed  into  the  single 
States  of  the  American  Union.*  Pelatiah  Webster  was  the 
first  to  conceive  of  the  application  of  the  principle  of  the 
division  of  powers  to  a  federal  state ;  he  was  the  first  to  pro- 
pose that  the  federal  head  should  be  divided  and  then 
organized,  as  the  particular  ones  are,  into  legislative,  execu- 
tive, and  judicial.  More  than  three  years  later  Jefferson 
endorsed  that  idea  by  commending  it  to  Madison.f  Having 
thus  made  his  second  great  invention,  Webster  proceeded 
to  explain  how  the  three  departments,  executive,  legislative, 
and  judicial,  should  be  organized.  His  idea  was  that  the 
executive  power  should  be  vested  in  a  council  of  ministers 
to  be  grouped  around  a  President  elected  by  Congress.  On 
that  subject  he  said:  "These  ministers  will  of  course  have 
the  best  information,  and  most  perfect  knowledge,  of  the 
state  of  the  Nation,  as  far  as  it  relates  to  their  several  depart- 
ments, and  will  of  course  be  able  to  give  the  best  information 
to  Congress,  in  what  manner  any  bill  proposed  will  affect 
the  public  interest  in  their  several  departments,  which  will 
nearly  comprehend  the  whole.  The  Financier  manages  the 
whole  subject  of  the  revenues  and  expenditures ;  the  Secretary 
of  State  takes  knowledge  of  the  general  policy  and  internal 
government;  the  Minister  of  War  presides  in  the  whole 
business  of  war  and  defence;  and  the  Minister  of  Foreign 
A  fairs  regards  the  whole  state  of  the  Nation,  as  it  stands 
related  to,  or  connected  with,  all  foreign  powers.  *  *  * 
I  would  further  propose,  that  the  aforesaid  great  ministers 
of  state  shall  compose  a  Council  of  State,  to  whose  number 
Congress  may  add  three  others,  viz :  one  from  New  England, 
one  from  the  Middle  States  and  one  from  the  Southern 
States,  one  of  which  to  be  appointed  President  by  Congress" 
To  the  organization  of  the  legislative  department  Webster 
gave  elaborate  consideration.  Just  as  no  prior  federal  gov- 
ernment had  ever  been  divided  into  three  departments,  so 

* Federalist ',  xlvi. 

f  In  the  letter  written  from  Paris,  December  16,  1786,  heretofore  cited. 


i8 

no  prior  federal  legislature  had  ever  been  divided  into  two 
houses. 

The  one-chamber  body  represented  by  the  Continental 
Congress  was  the  type  of  every  other  federal  assembly  that 
had  ever  preceded  it.  As  stated  heretofore  the  path-breaker, 
looking  to  the  English  bicameral  system  as  it  had  appeared 
in  the  several  States,  proposed  "  That  the  Congress  shall  con- 
sist of  two  chambers,  an  upper  and  lower  house,  or  senate  and 
commons,  with  the  concurrence  of  both  necessary  to  every  act; 
and  that  every  State  send  one  or  more  delegates  to  each  house : 
this  will  subject  every  act  to  two  discussions  before  two  dis- 
tinct chambers  of  men  equally  qualified  for  the  debate,  equally 
masters  of  the  subject,  and  of  equal  authority  in  the  decision." 
Citizens  of  the  United  States,  to  whom  such  a  division  now 
seems  a  matter  of  course,  should  remember  that  when 
Webster  proposed  it,  it  was  an  unprecedented  novelty  in  the 
history  of  the  world,  so  far  as  federal  legislatures  are  con- 
cerned. After  an  elaborate  discussion  of  the  qualifications 
of  members  of  Congress,  in  which  he  sharply  assailed  the 
then  existing  rule  forbidding  their  reelection,  he  proceeded 
to  define  a  part  of  the  original  jurisdiction  of  the  Supreme 
Court  of  the  United  States  by  saying  "that  the  supreme 
authority  should  be  vested  with  powers  to  terminate  and 
finally  decide  controversies  arising  between  different  States." 
He  also  said  "To  these  I  would  add  judges  of  law  and 
chancery"  Thus  the  entire  federal  judicial  system  was  dis- 
tinctly outlined.  Above  all  he  was  careful  to  define  the 
reserved  powers  of  the  States.  On  that  subject  he  said: 
"  I  propose  further,  that  the  powers  of  Congress,  and  all  the 
other  departments  acting  under  them,  shall  all  be  restricted 
to  such  matters  only  of  general  necessity  and  utility  to  all  the 
States,  as  cannot  come  within  the  jurisdiction  of  any  particu- 
lar State,  or  to  which  the  authority  of  any  particular  State  is 
not  competent:  so  that  each  particular  State  shall  enjoy  all 
sovereignty  and  supreme  authority  to  all  intents  and  pur- 
poses, excepting  only  those  high  authorities  and  powers  by 


them  delegated  to  Congress,  for  the  purposes  of  the  general 
union."  In  that  passage  we  have  the  first  draft,  and  a  very 
complete  one,  of  the  Tenth  Amendment.*  So  it  is  a  matter 
of  documentary  evidence  that  every  element  that  entered  into 
the  "wholly  novel  theory,  which  may  be  considered  a  great 
discovery  in  modern  political  science,"  and  which  differen- 
tiaties  our  second  federal  constitution  of  1789  from  every 
other  that  preceded  it,  was  the  deliberate  invention  of  Pelatiah 
Webster,  who  announced  to  the  world  that  theory,  as  an 
entirety,  in  his  epoch-making  paper  of  February  16,  1783. 
Prior  to  that  date  no  federal  government  had  ever  existed 
(1)  that  operated  directly  on  the  individual  citizen;  (2)  no 
federal  government  had  ever  been  divided  into  three  depart- 
ments, executive,  legislative,  and  judicial;  (3)  no  federal 
legislature  had  ever  been  divided  into  an  upper  and  lower 
house.  There  is  no  record,  there  is  not  even  a  claim  that, 
prior  to  that  date,  any  human  being  had  ever  propounded 
anyone  of  those  principles  in  connection  with  a  federal  gov- 
ernment. The  great  inventor  was  so  conscious  at  the  time 
of  the  magnitude  of  his  undertaking  that  he  exclaimed  as 
he  wrote: 

"May  Almighty  wisdom  direct  my  pen  in  this  arduous  dis- 
cussion." In  conclusion  he  said:  "This  vast  subject  lies 
with  mighty  weight  on  my  mind,  and  I  have  bestowed  on  it 
my  utmost  attention,  and  here  offer  the  public  the  best 
thoughts  and  sentiments  I  am  master  of .  *  *  *  I  have  not  the 
vanity  to  imagine  that  my  sentiments  may  be  adopted;  I 
shall  have  all  the  reward  I  wish  or  expect  if  my  Dissertation 
shall  throw  any  light  on  the  great  subject,  shall  excite  an 
emulation  of  inquiry,  and  animate  some  abler  genius  to  form 
a  plan  of  greater  perfection,  less  objectionable,  and  more 
useful."  In  his  republication  of  1791  he  described  perfectly 
the  circumstances  under  which  the  great  invention  of  Feb- 
ruary 16,  1783,  was  made,  when  he  said  that,  "the  public 

*It  provides  that  "The  powers  not  delegated  to  the  United  States  by  the  Con- 
stitution, nor  prohibited  by  it  to  the  States,  are  reserved  to  the  States  respectively 
or  to  the  people." 


20 

ideas  were  not  at  all  concentrated,  much  less  arranged  into 
any  new  system  or  form  of  government,  which  would  obviate 
these  evils.  Under  these  circumstances  I  offered  this  Dis- 
sertation to  the  public."  In  that  Dissertation,  Pelatiah 
Webster  presented,  as  a  free  gift  to  the  great  country  that 
has  neglected  and  forgotten  him,  the  "  new  system  or  form 
of  government"  which  passed,  through  the  four  "plans"* 
offered  in  the  Federal  Convention  of  1787,  into  the  existing 
Constitution  of  the  United  States.  Certainly  no  more 
"wonderful  work  was  ever  struck  off  at  a  given  time  by  the 
brain  and  purpose  of  man."  The  outcome  of  that  work  was 
a  novel  and  unique  creation  operating  directly  on  the  people, 
and  not  upon  the  States  as  corporations.  The  State  govern- 
ments are  not  subject  to  the  central  government.  The 
people  are  subject  to  both  governments.  The  new  creation 
is  in  no  respect  federal  in  its  operation,  although  it  is  in 
some  respects  federal  in  its  organization.  No  one  of  the 
three  basic  principles  constituting  the  great  invention  was 
seriously  questioned  in  the  Convention.  Its  mighty  and 
immortal  task  involved  only  their  adaptation  to  very  difficult 
and  complex  political  conditions.  The  inventor  of  the  plan 
stands  to  the  members  of  the  Convention  as  an  architect 
stands  to  master  builders. 

As  an  evidence  of  the  highly  practical  temper  of  Pelatiah 
Webster  the  fact  should  be  mentioned  in  conclusion  that, 
having  been  a  successful  merchant,  his  pet  hobby  seems  to 
have  been  to  create  a  Department  of  Commerce  in  close 
touch  with  Congress.  He  said:  "I  therefore  humbly  pro- 
pose, if  the  merchants  in  the  several  States  are  disposed  to 
send  delegates  from  their  body,  to  meet  and  attend  the  sitting 
of  Congress,  that  they  shall  be  permitted  to  form  a  chamber 

*At  a  later  time  a  grave  controversy  arose  as  to  "the  singularly  minute  coinci- 
dences between  the  draft  of  a  Federal  government  communicated  by  Mr.  Charles 
Pinckney  of  South  Carolina,  to  Mr.  Adams,  Secretary  of  State,"  the  Virginia  plan, 
and  the  Constitution  as  finally  adopted.  Every  explanation  was  given  of  "the 
singularly  minute  coincidences,"  except  the  plain  and  obvious  one — the  four  plans 
out  of  which  the  Constitution  arose  were  taken  from  a  common  source.  For  a 
statement  of  the  controversy  in  question  see  Rives'  Life  and  Times  of  Madison, 
vol.  ii,  pp.  353-357- 


21 

of  commerce,  and  their  advice  to  Congress  be  demanded  and 
admitted  concerning  all  bills  before  Congress,  as  far  as  the 
same  may  affect  the  trade  of  the  States"  In  his  criticisms 
made  in  1 79-1  of  the  work  of  the  Federal  Convention  he  said 
that  its  failure  to  accept  that  suggestion  was  a  great  mistake. 
The  very  recent  creation  of  a  Department  of  Commerce  and 
Labor  has  at  last  effectuated  his  idea.  Only  through  the 
vista  of  receding  years  can  such  an  epoch-making  mind  be 
viewed  in  all  its  grandeur.  What  signifies  a  century  of 
neglect  passed  in  the  midst  of  the  "momentous  conse- 
quences" his  mighty  work  has  wrought!  His  time  is  at 
hand ;  his  fame  is  as  safe  and  as  certain  as  the  immortality 
of  thought  and  the  unerring  justice  of  the  tribunal  of  history. 
His  abiding  faith  in  the  justice  of  that  tribunal  he  clearly 
expressed  when  he  said:  "But  if  any  of  these  questions 
should  in  future  time  become  objects  of  discussion,  neither 
the  vast  dignity  of  the  Convention,  nor  the  low  unnoticed 
state  of  myself,  will  be  at  all  considered  in  the  debates ;  the 
merits  of  the  matter,  and  the  interests  connected  with  or 
arising  out  of  it  will  alone  dictate  the  decision." 

The  humanly  impossible  and  miraculous  theory  which 
has  heretofore  serenely  assumed  that  the  greatest  and  most 
unique  of  all  political  inventions  had  no  inventor,  can  not 
survive  a  method  of  historical  investigations  that  under- 
takes to  demonstrate  that  beneath  every  shell  there  is  an 
animal,  behind  every  document  there  is  a  man.  The  emi- 
nent French  critic  and  historian  Ch.  V.  Langlais  has  said : 
"History  is  studied  from  documents.  Documents  are  the 
traces  which  have  been  left  by  the  thoughts  and  actions  of 
men  of  former  times.  There  is  no  substitute  for  documents: 
no  documents,  no  history."  Strange  indeed  it  is  that  the 
most  important  document  connected  with  our  Constitutional 
history  should  now  be  presented  to  the  jurists  and  statesmen 
of  the  United  States  as  if  it  were  a  papyrus  from  Egypt  or 
Herculaneum. 

Humbly  presented  by 

Hannis  Taylor. 


III. 

THE  EPOCH-MAKING  DOCUMENT  OF  FEBRUARY  16,  1783,  IN 
WHICH  IS  EMBODIED  THE  FIRST  DRAFT  OF  THE  EXIST- 
ING CONSTITUTION  OF  THE  UNITED  STATES: 

A 

DISSERTATION 

ON   THE 

POLI  TICAL    UNION 

AND 

CONSTITUTION 

OF   THE 

THIRTEEN    UNITED    STATES 

OF 

NORTH   AMERICA, 

which  is  necessary  to  their  Preservation  and  Happiness; 
humbly  offered  to  the  Public. 

[First published  in  Philadelphia,  1783.) 

I.  The  supreme  authority  of  auy  State  must  have  power 
enough  to  effect  the  ends  of  its  appointment,  otherwise  these 
ends  cannot  be  answered,  and  effectually  secured;  at  best 
they  are  precarious. — But  at  the  same  time, 

II.  The  supreme  authority  ought  to  be  so  limited  and 
checked,  if  possible,  as  to  prevent  the  abuse  of  power,  or  the 
exercise  of  powers  that  are  not  necessary  to  the  ends  of  its 
appointment,  but  hurtful  and  oppressive  to  the  subject;  but 
to  limit  a  supreme  authority  so  far  as  to  diminish  its  dignity, 
or  lessen  its  power  of  doing  good,  would  be  to  destroy  or  at 
least  to  corrupt  it,  and  render  it  ineffectual  to  its  ends. 

(23) 


24 

III.  A  number  of  sovereign  States  uniting  into  one  Com- 
monwealth, and  appointing  a  supreme  power  to  manage  the 
affairs  of  the  Union,  do  necessarily  and  unavoidably  part 
with  and  transfer  over  to  such  supreme  power,  so  much  of 
their  own  sovereignty  as  is  necessary  to  render  the  ends  of 
the  union  effectual,  otherwise  their  confederation  will  be  an 
union  without  bands  of  union,  like  a  cask  without  hoops, 
that  may  and  probably  will  fall  to  pieces,  as  soon  as  it  is 
put  to  any  exercise  which  requires  strength. 

In  like  manner,  every  member  of  civil  society  parts  with 
many  of  his  natural  rights,  that  he  may  enjoy  the  rest  in 
greater  security  under  the  protection  of  society. 

The  Union  of  the  Thirteen  States  of  America  is  of  mighty 
consequence  to  the  security,  sovereignty,  and  even  liberty  of 
each  of  them,  and  of  all  the  individuals  who  compose  them ; 
united  under  a  natural,  well  adjusted,  and  effectual  Consti- 
tution, they  are  a  strong,  rich,  growing  power,  with  great 
resources  and  means  of  defence,  which  no  foreign  power 
will  easily  attempt  to  invade  or  insult;  they  may  easily 
command  respect. 

As  their  exports  are  mostly  either  raw  materials  or  pro- 
visions, and  their  imports  mostly  finished  goods,  their  trade 
becomes  a  capital  object  with  every  manufacturing  nation  of 
Burope,  and  all  the  southern  colonies  of  America;  their 
friendship  and  trade  will  of  course  be  courted,  and  each 
power  in  amity  with  them  will  contribute  to  their  security. 

Their  union  is  of  great  moment  in  another  respect;  they 
thereby  form  a  superintending  power  among  themselves, 
that  can  moderate  and  terminate  disputes  that  may  arise 
between  different  States,  restrain  intestine  violence,  and 
prevent  any  recourse  to  the  dreadful  decision  of  the  sword. 

I  do  not  mean  here  to  go  into  a  detail  of  all  the  advantages 
of  our  union;  they  offer  themselves  on  every  view,  and  are 
important  enough  to  engage  every  honest,  prudent  mind,  to 
secure  and  establish  that  union  by  every  possible  method, 
that  we  may  enjoy  the  full  benefit  of  it,  and  be  rendered 
happy  and  safe  under  the  protection  it  affords. 

This  union,  however  important,  cannot  be  supported 
without  a  Constitution  founded  on  principles  of  natural 
truth,  fitness,  and  utility.  If  there  is  one  article  wrong  in 
such  Constitution,  it  will  discover  itself  in  practice,  by  its 
baleful  operation,  and  destroy  or  at  least  injure  the  union. 


25 

Many  nations  have  been  mined  by  the  errors  of  their 
political  constitutions.  Such  errors  first  introduce  wrongs 
and  injuries,  which  soon  breed  discontents,  which  gradually 
work  up  into  mortal  hatred  and  resentments ;  hence  invet- 
erate parties  are  formed,  which  of  course  make  the  whole 
community  a  house  divided  against  itself,  which  soon  falls 
either  a  prey  to  some  enemies  without,  who  watch  to  devour 
them,  or  else  crumble  into  their  original  constituent  parts, 
and  lose  all  respectability,  strength,  and  security. 

It  is  as  physically  impossible  to  secure  to  civil  society,  good 
cement  of  union,  duration,  and  security  without  a  Constitu- 
tion founded  on  principles  of  natural  fitness  and  right,  as  to 
raise  timbers  into  a  strong,  compact  building,  which  have 
not  been  framed  upon  true  geometric  principles ;  for  if  you 
cut  one  beam  a  foot  too  long  or  too  short,  not  all  the  author- 
ity and  all  the  force  of  all  the  carpenters  can  ever  get  it  into 
its  place,  and  make  it  fit  with  proper  symmetry  there. 

As  the  fate  then  of  all  governments  depends  much  upon 
their  political  constitutions,  they  become  an  object  of  mighty 
moment  to  the  happiness  and  well-being  of  society ;  and  as 
the  framing  of  such  a  Constitution  requires  great  knowledge 
of  the  rights  of  men  and  societies,  as  well  as  of  the  interests, 
circumstances,  and  even  prejudices  of  the  several  parts  of 
the  community  or  commonwealth,  for  which  it  is  intended; 
it  becomes  a  very  complex  subject,  and  of  course  requires 
great  steadiness  and  comprehension  of  thought,  as  well  as 
great  knowledge  of  men  and  things,  to  do  it  properly.  I 
shall,  however,  attempt  it  with  my  best  abilities,  and  hope 
from  the  candor  of  the  public  to  escape  censure,  if  I  cannot 
merit  praise. 

I  begin  with  my  first  and  great  principle,  viz :  That  the 
Constitution  must  vest  powers  in  every  department  sufficient 
to  secure  and  make  effectual  the  ends  of  it.  The  supreme 
authority  must  have  the  power  of  making  war  and  peace — 
of  appointing  armies  and  navies — of  appointing  officers  both 
civil  and  military — of  making  contracts — of  emitting,  coin- 
ing, and  borrowing  money — of  regulating  trade — of  making 
treaties  with  foreign  powers — of  establishing  post-offices — 
and  in  short  of  doing  everything  which  the  well-being  of  the 
Commonwealth  may  require,  and  which  is  not  compatible  to 
any  particular  State,  all  of  which  require  money,  and  cannot 
possibly  be  made  effectual  without  it. 


26 

They  must  therefore  of  necessity  be  vested  with  power  of 
taxation.  I  know  this  is  a  most  important  and  weighty 
truth,  a  dreadful  engine  of  oppression,  tyranny,  and  injury, 
when  ill  used;  yet,  from  the  necessity  of  the  case,  it  must 
be  admitted. 

For  to  give  a  supreme  authority  a  power  of  making  con- 
tracts, without  any  power  of  payment — of  appointing  officers 
civil  and  military,  without  money  to  pay  them — a  power  to 
build  ships,  without  any  money  to  do  it  with — a  power  of 
emitting  money,  without  any  power  to  redeem  it — or  of  bor- 
rowing money,  without  any  power  to  make  payment,  etc., 
etc. — such  solecisms  in  government  are  so  nugatory  and 
absurd,  that  I  really  think  to  offer  further  argument  on  the 
subject,  would  be  to  insult  the  understanding  of  my  readers. 

To  make  all  these  payments  dependent  on  the  votes  of 
thirteen  popular  assemblies,  who  will  undertake  to  judge  of 
the  propriety  of  every  contract  and  every  occasion  of  money, 
and  grant  or  withhold  supplies,  according  to  their  opinion, 
whilst  at  the  same  time  the  operations  of  the  whole  may  be 
stopped  by  the  vote  of  a  single  one  of  them,  is  absurd ;  for 
this  renders  all  supplies  so  precarious  and  the  public  credit 
so  extremely  uncertain,  as  must  in  its  nature  render  all 
efforts  in  war,  and  all  regular  administration  in  peace,  utterly 
impracticable,  as  well  as  most  pointedly  ridiculous.  Is  there 
a  man  to  be  found  who  would  lend  money,  or  render  personal 
services,  or  make  contracts  on  such  precarious  security?  Of 
this  we  have  a  proof  of  fact,  the  strongest  of  all  proofs,  a 
fatal  experience,  the  surest  tho'  severest  of  all  demonstra- 
tion, which  renders  all  other  proof  or  argument  on  this 
subject  quite  unnecessary. 

The  present  broken  state  of  our  finances — public  debts 
and  bankruptcies — enormous  and  ridiculous  depreciation  of 
public  securities — with  the  total  annihilation  of  our  public 
credit — prove  beyond  all  contradiction  the  vanity  of  all 
recourse  to  the  federal  Assemblies  of  the  States.  The  recent 
instance  of  the  duty  of  5  per  cent  on  imported  goods,  struck 
dead,  and  the  bankruptcies  which  ensued  on  the  single  vote 
of  Rhode  Island,  affords  another  proof  of  what  it  is  certain 
may  be  done  again  in  like  circumstances. 

I  have  another  reason  why  a  power  of  taxation  or  of  rais- 
ing money,  ought  to  be  vested  in  the  supreme  authority  of 
our  commonwealth,  viz,  the  monies  necessary  for  the  public 


27 

ought  to  be  raised  by  a  duty  imposed  on  imported  goods,  not 
a  bare  5  per  cent  or  any  other  per  cent  on  all  imported  goods 
indiscriminately,  but  a  duty  much  heavier  on  all  articles  of 
luxury  or  mere  ornament,  and  which  are  consumed  princi- 
pally by  the  rich  or  prodigal  part  of  the  community,  such  as 
silks  of  all  sorts,  muslins,  cambricks,  lawns,  superfine  cloths, 
spirits,  wines,  etc.,  etc. 

Such  an  impost  would  ease  the  husbandman,  the  mechanic, 
and  the  poor ;  would  have  all  the  practical  effects  of  a  sumptu- 
ary law ;  would  mend  the  economy,  and  increase  the  industry, 
of  the  community ;  would  be  collected  without  the  shocking 
circumstances  of  collectors  and  their  warrants ;  and  make  the 
quantity  of  tax  paid,  always  depend  on  the  choice  of  the 
person  who  pays  it. 

This  tax  can  be  laid  by  the  supreme  authority  much  more 
conveniently  than  by  the  particular  Assemblies,  and  would 
in  no  case  be  subject  to  their  repeals  or  modifications ;  and 
of  course  the  public  credit  would  never  be  dependent  on,  or 
liable  to  bankruptcy  by  the  humors  of  any  particular  Assem- 
bly. In  an  Bssay  on  Finance,  which  I  design  soon  to  offer 
to  the  public,  this  subject  will  be  treated  more  fully.  (See 
my  Sixth  Bssay  on  Free  Trade  and  Finance,  p.  229.) 

The  delegates  which  are  to  form  that  august  body,  which 
are  to  hold  and  exercise  the  supreme  authority,  ought  to  be 
appointed  by  the  States  in  any  manner  they  please ;  in  which 
they  should  not  be  limited  by  any  restrictions ;  their  own 
dignity  and  the  weight  they  will  hold  in  the  great  public 
councils,  will  always  depend  on  the  abilities  of  the  persons 
they  appoint  to  represent  them  there;  and  if  they  are  wise 
enough  to  choose  men  of  sufficient  abilities,  and  respectable 
characters,  men  of  sound  sense,  extensive  knowledge,  gravity, 
and  integrity,  they  will  reap  the  honor  and  advantage  of  such 
wisdom. 

But  if  they  are  fools  enough  to  appoint  men  of  trifling  or 
vile  characters,  of  mean  abilities,  faulty  morals,  or  despicable 
ignorance,  they  must  reap  the  fruits  of  such  folly,  and  con- 
tent themselves  to  have  no  weight,  dignity,  or  esteem  in  the 
public  councils;  and,  what  is  more  to  be  lamented  by  the 
Commonwealth,  to  do  no  good  there. 

I  have  no  objection  to  the  States  electing  and  recalling 
their  delegates  as  often  as  they  please,  but  think  it  hard  and 
very  injurious  both  to  them  and  the  Commonwealth  that  they 


28 

should  be  obliged  to  discontinue  them  after  three  years' 
service,  if  they  find  them  on  that  trial  to  be  men  of  sufficient 
integrity  and  abilities ;  a  man  of  that  experience  is  certainly 
much  more  qualified  to  serve  in  the  place,  than  a  new  mem- 
ber of  equal  good  character  can  be ;  experience  makes  perfect 
in  every  kind  of  business — old,  experienced  statesmen,  of 
tried  and  approved  integrity  and  abilities,  are  a  great  bless- 
ing to  a  State — they  acquire  great  authority  and  esteem  as 
well  as  wisdom,  and  very  much  contribute  to  keep  the  system 
of  government  in  good  and  salutary  order ;  and  this  furnishes 
the  strongest  reason  why  they  should  be  continued  in  the 
service,  on  Plato's  great  maxim,  that  "the  man  best  qualified 
to  serve,  ought  to  be  appointed." 

I  am  sorry  to  see  a  contrary  maxim  adopted  in  our  Ameri- 
can counsels;  to  make  the  highest  reason  that  can  be  given 
for  continuing  a  man  in  the  public  administration,  assigned 
as  a  constitutional  and  absolute  reason  for  turning  him  out, 
seems  to  me  to  be  a  solecism  of  a  piece  with  many  other 
reforms,  by  which  we  set  out  to  surprise  the  world  with  our 
wisdom. 

If  we  should  adopt  this  maxim  in  the  common  affairs  of 
life,  it  would  be  found  inconvenient,  e.  g.,  if  we  should  make 
it  a  part  of  our  Constitution,  that  a  man  who  has  served  a 
three  years'  apprenticeship  to  the  trade  of  a  tailor  or  shoe- 
maker, should  be  obliged  to  discontinue  that  business  for  the 
three  successive  years,  I  am  of  opinion  the  country  would 
soon  be  cleared  of  good  shoemakers  and  tailors. — Men  are 
no  more  born  statesmen  than  shoemakers  or  tailors — Experi- 
ence is  equally  necessary  to  perfection  in  both. 

It  seems  to  me  that  a  man's  inducement  to  qualify  himself 
for  a  public  employment,  and  make  himself  master  of  it,  must 
be  much  discouraged  by  this  consideration,  that  let  him  take 
whatever  pains  to  qualify  himself  in  the  best  manner,  he 
must  be  shortly  turned  out,  and  of  course  it  would  be  of 
more  consequence  to  him,  to  turn  his  attention  to  some  other 
business,  which  he  might  adopt  when  his  present  appoint- 
ment should  expire;  and  by  this  means  the  Commonwealth 
is  in  danger  of  losing  the  zeal,  industry,  and  shining  abilities, 
as  well  as  services,  of  their  most  accomplished  and  valuable 
men. 

I  hear  that  the  State  of  Georgia  has  improved  on  this 
blessed  principle,  and  limited  the  continuance  of  their  gov- 


29 

ernors  to  one  year;  the  consequence  is,  they  have  already 
the  ghosts  of  departed  governors  stalking  about  in  every 
part  of  their  State,  and  growing  more  plenty  every  year; 
and  as  the  price  of  everything  is  reduced  by  its  plenty,  I  can 
suppose  governors  will  soon  be  very  low  there. 

This  doctrine  of  rotation  was  first  proposed  by  some 
sprightly  geniuses  of  brilliant  politics,  with  this  cogent 
reason ;  that  by  introducing  a  rotation  in  the  public  offices, 
we  should  have  a  great  number  of  men  trained  up  to  public 
service ;  but  it  appears  to  me  that  it  will  be  more  likely  to 
produce  many  jacks  at  all  trades,  but  good  at  none. 

I  think  that  frequent  elections  are  a  sufficient  security 
against  the  continuance  of  men  in  public  office  whose  conduct 
is  not  approved,  and  there  can  be  no  reason  for  excluding 
those  whose  conduct  is  approved,  and  who  are  allowed  to  be 
better  qualified  than  any  men  who  can  be  found  to  supply 
their  places. 

Another  great  object  of  government,  is  the  apportionment 
of  burdens  and  benefits ;  for  if  a  greater  quota  of  burden,  or 
a  less  quota  of  benefits  than  is  just  and  right,  be  allotted  to 
any  State,  this  ill  apportionment  will  be  an  everlasting  source' 
of  uneasiness  and  discontent.  In  the  first  case,  the  over- 
burdened State  will  complain;  in  the  last  case,  all  the  States, 
whose  quota  of  benefit  is  under-rated,  will  be  uneasy;  and 
this  is  a  case  of  such  delicacy,  that  it  cannot  be  safely  trusted 
to  the  arbitrary  opinion  or  judgment  of  any  body  of  men 
however  august. 

Some  natural  principles  of  confessed  equity,  and  which  can 
be  reduced  to  a  certainty,  ought,  if  possible,  to  be  found  and 
adopted;  for  it  is  of  the  highest  moment  to  the  Common- 
wealth, to  obviate,  and,  if  possible,  wholly  to  take  away,  such 
a  fruitful  and  common  source  of  infinite  disputes,  as  that  of 
apportionment  of  quotas  has  ever  proved  in  all  States  of  the 
earth. 

The  value  of  lands  may  be  a  good  rule ;  but  the  ascertain- 
ment of  that  value  is  impracticable ;  no  assessment  can  be 
made  which  will  not  be  liable  to  exception  and  debate — to 
adopt  a  good  rule  in  anything  which  is  impracticable,  is 
absurd ;  for  it  is  physically  impossible  that  anything  should 
be  good  for  practise,  which  cannot  be  practised  at  all ;  but  if 
the  value  of  lands  was  capable  of  certain  assessment,  yet  to 
adopt  that  value  as  a  rule  of  apportionment  of  quotas,  and 


3° 

at  the  same  time  to  except  from  valuation  large  tracts  of 
sundry  States  of  immense  value,  which  have  all  been  defended 
by  the  joint  arms  of  the  whole  Empire,  and  for  the  defence 
of  which  no  additional  quota  of  supply  is  to  be  demanded  of 
those  States,  to  whom  such  lands  are  secured  by  such  joint 
efforts  of  the  States,  is  in  its  nature  unreasonable,  and  will 
open  a  door  for  great  complaint. 

It  is  plain  without  argument,  that  such  States  ought  either 
to  make  grants  to  the  Commonwealth  of  such  tracts  of 
defended  territory,  or  sell  as  much  of  them  as  will  pay  their 
proper  quota  of  defence,  and  pay  such  sums  into  the  public 
treasury ;  and  this  ought  to  be  done,  let  what  rule  of  quota 
forever  be  adopted  with  respect  to  the  cultivated  part  of  the 
United  States ;  for  no  proposition  of  natural  right  and  justice 
can  be  plainer  than  this,  that  every  part  of  valuable  property 
which  is  defended,  ought  to  contribute  its  quota  of  supply 
for  that  defence. 

If  then  the  value  of  cultivated  lands  is  found  to  be  an 
impracticable  rule  of  apportionment  of  quotas,  we  have  to 
seek  for  some  other,  equally  just  and  less  exceptionable. 

It  appears  to  me,  that  the  number  of  living  souls  or 
human  persons  of  whatever  age,  sex,  or  condition,  will  afford 
us  a  rule  or  measure  of  apportionment  which  will  forever 
increase  and  decrease  with  the  real  wealth  of  the  States,  and 
will  of  course  be  a  perpetual  rule,  not  capable  of  corruption 
by  any  circumstances  of  future  time;  which  is  of  vast  con- 
sideration in  forming  a  constitution  which  is  designed  for 
perpetual  duration,  and  which  will  in  its  nature  be  as  just 
as  to  the  inhabited  parts  of  each  State,  as  that  of  the  value 
of  lands,  or  any  other  that  has  or  can  be  mentioned. 

Land  takes  its  value  not  merely  from  the  goodness  of  its 
soil,  but  from  innumerable  other  relative  advantages  among 
which  the  population  of  the  country  may  be  considered  as 
principal;  as  lands  in  a  full  settled  country  will  always 
(caeteris  paribus)  bring  more  than  lands  in  thin  settlements. 
On  this  principle,  when  the  inhabitants  of  Russia,  Poland, 
etc.,  sell  real  estates,  they  do  not  value  them  as  we  do,  by 
the  number  of  acres,  but  by  the  number  of  people  who  live 
on  them. 

Where  any  piece  of  land  has  many  advantages  many 
people  will  crowd  there  to  obtain  them;  which  will  create 
many  competitors  for  the  purchase  of  it;  which  will  of  course 


3i 

raise  the  price.  Where  there  are  fewer  advantages,  there 
will  be  fewer  competitors,  and  of  course  a  less  price;  and 
these  two  things  will  forever  be  proportionate  to  each  other, 
and  of  course  the  one  will  always  be  a  sure  index  of  the 
other. 

The  only  considerable  objection  I  have  ever  heard  to  this, 
is,  that  the  quality  of  inhabitants  differs  in  the  different 
States,  and  it  is  not  reasonable  that  the  black  slaves  in  the 
southern  States  should  be  estimated  on  a  par  with  the  white 
freemen  in  the  northern  States  To  discuss  this  question 
fairly,  I  think  it  will  be  just  to  estimate  the  neat  value  of 
the  labor  of  both;  and  if  it  shall  appear  that  the  labor  of  the 
black  person  produces  as  much  neat  wealth  to  the  southern 
State,  as  the  labor  of  the  white  person  does  to  the  northern 
State,  I  think  it  will  follow  plainly  that  they  are  equally 
useful  inhabitants  in  point  of  wealth ;  and  therefore  in  the 
case  before  us,  should  be  estimated  alike. 

And  if  the  amazing  profits  which  the  southern  planters 
boast  of  receiving  from  the  labor  of  their  slaves  on  their 
plantations,  are  real,  the  southern  people  have  greatly  the 
advantage  in  this  kind  of  estimation,  and  as  this  objection 
comes  principally  from  the  southward,  I  should  suppose 
that  the  gentlemen  from  that  part  would  blush  to  urge  it 
any  farther. 

That  the  supreme  authority  should  be  vested  with  powers 
to  terminate  and  finally  decide  controversies  arising  between 
different  States,  I  take  it,  will  be  universally  admitted,  but  I 
humbly  apprehend  that  an  appeal  from  the  first  instance  of 
trial  ought  to  be  admitted  in  causes  of  great  moment,  on  the 
same  reasons  that  such  appeals  are  admitted  in  all  the  States 
of  Burope.  It  is  well  known  to  all  men  versed  in  courts, 
that  the  first  hearing  of  a  cause  rather  gives  an  opening  to 
that  evidence  and  reason  which  ought  to  decide  it,  than  such 
a  full  examination  and  thorough  discussion,  as  should  always 
precede  a  final  judgment,  in  causes  of  national  consequence. 
A  detail  of  reasons  might  be  added,  which  I  deem  it  unnec- 
essary to  enlarge  on  here. 

The  supreme  authority  ought  to  have  a  power  of  peace 
and  war,  and  forming  treaties  and  alliances  with  all  foreign 
powers ;  which  implies  a  necessity  of  their  also  having  suffi- 
cient powers  to  enforce  the  obedience  of  all  subjects  of  the 
United   States   to   such   treaties    and   alliances;    with   full 


32 

powers  to  unite  the  force  of  the  States;  and  direct  its  opera- 
tions in  war;  and  to  punish  all  transgressors  in  all  these 
respects ;  otherwise,  by  the  imprudence  of  a  few,  the  whole 
Commonwealth  may  be  embroiled  with  foreign  powers,  and 
the  operations  of  war  may  be  rendered  useless,  or  fail  much 
of  their  due  effect. 

All  these  I  conceive  will  be  easiry  granted,  especially  the 
latter,  as  the  power  of  Congress  to  appoint  and  direct  the 
army  and  navy  in  war,  with  all  departments  thereto  belong- 
ing, and  punishing  delinquents  in  them  all,  is  already 
admitted  into  practise  in  the  course  of  the  present  unhappy 
war,  in  which  we  have  been  long  engaged. 

II.  But  now  the  great  and  most  difficult  part  of  this 
weighty  subject  remains  to  be  considered,  viz,  how  these 
supreme  powers  are  to  be  constituted  in  such  manner  that 
they  may  be  able  to  exercise  with  full  force  and  effect,  the 
vast  authorities  committed  to  them,  for  the  good  and  well- 
being  of  the  United  States,  and  yet  be  so  checked  and 
restrained  from  exercising  them  to  the  injury  and  ruin  of 
the  States,  that  we  may  with  safety  trust  them  with  a  com- 
mission of  such  vast  magnitude — and  may  Almighty  wisdom 
direct  my  pen  in  this  arduous  discussion. 

i.  The  men  who  compose  this  important  council,  must  be 
delegated  from  all  the  States;  and,  of  course,  the  hope  of 
approbation  and  continuance  of  honors,  will  naturally  stimu- 
late them  to  act  right,  and  to  please;  the  dread  of  censure 
and  disgrace  will  naturally  operate  as  a  check  to  restrain 
them  from  improper  behavior:  but  however  natural  and 
forcible  these  motives  may  be,  we  find  by  sad  experience, 
they  are  not  always  strong  enough  to  produce  the  effects  we 
expect  and  wish  from  them. 

It  is  to  be  wished  that  none  might  be  appointed  that  were 
not  fit  and  adequate  to  this  weighty  business;  but  a  little 
knowledge  of  human  nature,  and  a  little  acquaintance  with 
the  political  history  of  mankind,  will  soon  teach  us  that  this 
is  not  to  be  expected. 

The  representatives  appointed  by  popular  elections  are 
commonly  not  only  the  legal,  but  real,  substantial  representa- 
tives of  their  electors,  i.  e.y  there  will  commonly  be  about  the 
same  proportion  of  grave,  sound,  well-qualified  men,  trifling, 
desultory  men — wild  or  knavish  schemers — and  dull,  ignorant 
fools,  in  the  delegated  assembly,  as  in  the  body  of  electors. 


33 

I  know  of  no  way  to  help  this ;  such  delegates  must  be 
admitted,  as  the  States  are  pleased  to  send ;  and  all  that  can 
be  done  is,  when  they  get  together,  to  make  the  best  of  them. 

We  will  suppose  then  they  are  all  met  in  Congress,  clothed 
with  that  vast  authority  which  is  necessary  to  the  well- 
being,  and  even  existence,  of  the  union,  that  they  should  be 
vested  with;  how  shall  we  empower  them  to  do  all  necessary 
and  effectual  good,  and  restrain  them  from  doing  hurt?  To 
do  this  properly,  I  think  we  must  recur  to  those  natural 
motives  of  action,  those  feelings  and  apprehensions,  which 
usually  occur  to  the  mind  at  the  very  time  of  action;  for 
distant  consequences,  however  weighty,  are  often  too  much 
disregarded. 

Truth  loves  light,  and  is  vindicated  by  it.  Wrong  shrouds 
itself  in  darkness,  and  is  supported  by  delusion.  An  honest 
well-qualified  man  loves  light,  can  bear  close  examination, 
and  critical  inquiry,  and  is  best  pleased  when  he  is  most 
thoroughly  understood:  a  man  of  corrupt  design,  or  a  fool  of 
no  design,  hates  close  examination  and  critical  inquiry;  the 
knavery  of  the  one,  and  the  ignorance  of  the  other,  are  dis- 
covered by  it,  and  they  both  usually  grow  uneasy,  before  the 
investigation  is  half  done.  I  do  not  believe  that  there  is  a 
more  natural  truth  in  the  world,  than  that  divine  one  of  our 
Saviour,  "he  that  doth  truth, cometh  to  the  light."  I  would 
therefore  recommend  that  mode  of  deliberation,  which  will 
naturally  bring  on  the  most  thorough  and  critical  discussion 
of  the  subject,  previous  to  passing  any  act;  and  for  that  pur- 
pose humbly  propose, 

2.  That  the  Congress  shall  consist  of  two  chambers,  an 
upper  and  a  lower  house,  or  senate  and  commons,  with  the 
concurrence  of  both  necessary  to  every  act;  and  that  every 
State  send  one  or  more  delegates  to  each  house:  this  will 
subject  every  act  to  two  discussions  before  two  distinct  cham- 
bers of  men  equally  qualified  for  the  debate,  equally  masters 
of  the  subject,  and  of  equal  authority  in  the  decision. 

These  two  houses  will  be  governed  by  the  same  natural 
motives  and  interests,  viz,  the  good  of  the  Commonwealth, 
and  the  approbation  of  the  people.  Whilst  at  the  same  time, 
the  emulation  naturally  arising  between  them,  will  induce  a 
very  critical  and  sharp-sighted  inspection  into  the  motions  of 
each  other.  Their  different  opinions  will  bring  on  confer- 
ences between  the  two  houses,  in  which  the  whole  subject 


34 

will  be  exhausted  in  arguments  pro  and  con,  and  shame  will 
be  the  portion  of  obstinate  convicted  error. 

Under  these  circumstances,  a  man  of  ignorance  or  evil 
design  will  be  afraid  to  impose  on  the  credulity,  inattention, 
or  confidence  of  his  house,  by  introducing  any  corrupt  or 
undigested  proposition,  which  he  knows  he  must  be  called 
on  to  defend  against  the  severe  scrutiny  and  poignant  objec- 
tions of  the  other  house.  I  do  not  believe  the  many  hurtful 
and  foolish  legislative  acts  which  first  or  last  have  injured 
all  the  States  on  earth,  have  originated  so  much  in  corrup- 
tion as  indolence,  ignorance,  and  a  want  of  a  full  compre- 
hension of  the  subject,  which  a  full,  prying  and  emulous 
discussion  would  tend  in  a  great  measure  to  remove:  this 
naturally  rouses  the  lazy  and  idle,  who  hate  the  pain  of  close 
thinking;  animates  the  ambitious  to  excel  in  policy  and 
argument;  and  excites  the  whole  to  support  the  dignity  of 
their  house,  and  vindicate  their  own  propositions. 

I  am  not  of  opinion  that  bodies  of  elective  men,  which 
usually  compose  Parliaments,  Diets,  Assemblies,  Congresses, 
etc.,  are  commonly  dishonest:  but  I  believe  it  rarely  happens 
that  there  are  not  designing  men  among  them;  and  I  think 
it  would  be  much  more  difficult  for  them  to  unite  their  par- 
tisans in  two  houses,  and  corrupt  or  deceive  them  both,  than 
to  carry  on  their  designs  where  there  is  but  one  unalarmed, 
unapprehensive  house  to  be  managed;  and  as  there  is  no 
hope  of  making  these  bad  men  good,  the  best  policy  is  to 
embarrass  them,  and  make  their  work  as  difficult  as  possible. 

In  these  assemblies  are  frequently  to  be  found  sanguine 
men,  upright  enough  indeed,  but  of  strong,  wild  projection, 
whose  brains  are  always  teeming  with  Utopian,  chimerical 
plans,  and  political  whims,  very  destructive  to  society.  I 
hardly  know  a  greater  evil  than  to  have  the  supreme  council 
of  a  Nation  played  off  on  such  men's  wires ;  such  baseless 
visions  at  best  end  in  darkness,  and  the  dance,  though  easy 
and  merry  enough  at  first,  rarely  fails  to  plunge  the  credu- 
lous, simple  followers  into  sloughs  and  bogs  at  last. 

Nothing  can  tend  more  effectually  to  obviate  these  evils, 
and  to  mortify  and  cure  such  maggoty  brains,  than  to  see 
the  absurdity  of  their  projects  exposed  by  the  several  argu- 
ments and  keen  satire  which  a  full,  emulous,  and  spirited 
discussion  of  the  subject  will  naturally  produce:  we  have 
had  enough  of  these  geniuses  in  the  short  course  of  our 


35 

politics,  both  in  our  national  and  provincial  councils,  and 
have  felt  enough  of  their  evil  effects,  to  induce  us  to  wish 
for  any  good  method  to  keep  ourselves  clear  of  them  in 
future. 

The  consultations  and  decisions  of  national  councils  are 
so  very  important,  that  the  fate  of  millions  depends  on  them, 
therefore  no  man  ought  to  speak  in  such  assemblies,  without 
considering  that  the  fate  of  millions  hangs  on  his  tongue, 
— and  of  course  a  man  can  have  no  right  in  such  august 
councils  to  utter  undigested  sentiments,  or  indulge  himself 
in  sudden,  unexamined  flights  of  thought;  his  most  tried 
and  improved  abilities  are  due  to  the  State,  who  have 
trusted  him  with  their  most  important  interests. 

A  man  must  therefore  be  most  inexcusable,  who  is  either 
absent  during  such  debates,  or  sleeps,  or  whispers,  or  catches 
flies  during  the  argument,  and  just  rouses  when  the  vote  is 
called,  to  give  his  yea  or  nay,  to  the  weal  or  woe  of  a  nation. 
Therefore  it  is  manifestly  proper,  that  every  natural  motive 
that  can  operate  on  his  understanding,  or  his  passions,  to 
engage  his  attention  and  utmost  efforts,  should  be  put  in 
practise,  and  that  his  present  feelings  should  be  raised  by 
every  motive  of  honor  and  shame,  to  stimulate  him  to  every 
practicable  degree  of  diligence  and  exertion,  to  be  as  far 
as  possible  useful  in  the  great  discussion. 

I  appeal  to  the  feelings  of  every  reader,  if  he  would  not 
(were  he  in  either  house)  be  much  more  strongly  and  naturally 
induced  to  exert  his  utmost  abilities  and  attention  to  any 
question  which  was  to  pass  through  the  ordeal  of  a  spirited 
discussion  of  another  house,  than  he  would  do,  if  the  abso- 
lute decision  depended  on  his  own  house,  without  any  further 
inquiry  or  challenge  on  the  subject. 

As  Congress  will  ever  be  composed  of  men  delegated  by 
the  several  States,  it  may  well  be  supposed  that  they  have 
the  confidence  of  their  several  States,  and  understand  well 
the  policy  and  present  condition  of  them;  it  may  also  be 
supposed  that  they  come  with  strong  local  attachments, 
and  habits  of  thinking  limited  to  the  interests  of  their  par- 
ticular States ;  it  may  therefore  be  supposed  they  will  need 
much  information,  in  order  to  their  gaining  that  enlarge- 
ment of  ideas,  and  great  comprehension  of  thought,  which  will 
be  necessary  to  enable  them  to  think  properly  on  that  large 
scale,  which  takes  into  view  the  interests  of  all  the  States. 


36 

The  greatest  care  and  wisdom  is  therefore  requisite  to 
give  them  the  best  and  surest  information,  and  of  that  kind 
that  may  be  the  most  safely  relied  on,  to  prevent  their  being 
deluded  or  prejudiced  by  partial  representations,  made  by 
interested  men  who  have  particular  views. 

This  information  may  perhaps  be  best  made  by  the  great 
ministers  of  state,  who  ought  to  be  men  of  the  greatest 
abilities  and  integrity;  their  business  is  confined  to  their 
several  departments,  and  their  attention  engaged  strongly 
and  constantly  to  all  the  several  parts  of  the  same;  the 
whole  arrangement,  method,  and  order  of  which,  are  formed, 
superintended,  and  managed  in  their  offices,  and  all  infor- 
mation relative  to  their  department  centre  there. 

These  ministers  will  of  course  have  the  best  information, 
and  most  perfect  knowledge,  of  the  state  of  the  Nation,  as  far 
as  it  relates  to  their  several  departments,  and  will  of  course  be 
able  to  give  the  best  information  to  Congress,  in  what  manner 
any  bill  proposed  will  affect  the  public  interest  in  their  several 
departments,  which  will  nearly  comprehend  the  whole. 

The  Financiers  manages  the  whole  subject  of  revenues 
and  expenditures — the  Secretary  of  State  takes  knowledge 
of  the  general  policy  and  internal  government — the  minister 
of  war  presides  in  the  whole  business  of  war  and  defense — 
and  the  minister  of  foreign  affairs  regards  the  whole  state  of 
the  nation,  as  it  stands  related  to,  or  connected  with,  all 
foreign  powers. 

I  mention  a  Secretary  of  State,  because  all  other  nations 
have  one,  and  I  suppose  we  shall  need  one  as  much  as  they, 
and  the  multiplicity  of  affairs  which  naturally  fall  into  his 
office  will  grow  so  fast,  that  I  imagine  we  shall  soon  be  under 
the  necessity  of  appointing  one. 

To  these  I  would  add  Judges  of  Law,  and  chancery ;  but 
I  fear  they  will  not  be  very  soon  appointed — the  one  sup- 
poses the  existence  of  law,  the  other  of  equity — and  when 
we  shall  be  altogether  convinced  of  the  absolute  necessity 
of  the  real  and  effectual  existence  of  both  of  these,  we  shall 
probably  appoint  proper  heads  to  preside  in  those  depart- 
ments.    I  would  therefore  propose, 

3.  That  when  any  bill  shall  pass  the  second  reading  in 
the  house  in  which  it  originates,  and  before  it  shall  be  finally 
enacted,  copies  of  it  shall  be  sent  to  each  of  the  said  ministers 
of  state,  in  being  at  the  time,  who  shall  give  said  house  in 


37 

writing,  the  fullest  information  in  their  power,  and  their 
most  explicit  sentiments  of  the  operation  of  the  said  bill  on 
the  public  interest,  as  far  as  relates  to  their  respective 
departments,  which  shall  be  received  and  read  in  said  house, 
and  entered  on  their  minutes,  before  they  finally  pass  the 
bill;  and  when  they  send  the  bill  for  concurrence  to  the 
other  house,  they  shall  send  therewith  the  said  informations 
of  the  said  ministers  of  state,  which  shall  likewise  be  read 
in  that  house  before  their  concurrence  is  finally  passed. 

I  do  not  mean  to  give  these  great  ministers  of  state  a 
negative  on  Congress,  but  I  mean  to  oblige  Congress  to 
receive  their  advices  before  they  pass  their  bills,  and  that 
every  act  shall  be  void  that  is  not  passed  with  these  forms ; 
and  I  further  propose,  that  either  house  of  Congress  may, 
if  they  please,  admit  the  said  ministers  to  be  present  and 
assist  in  the  debates  of  the  house,  but  without  any  right  of 
vote  in  the  decision. 

It  appears  to  me  that  if  every  act  shall  pass  so  many 
different  corps  of  discussion  before  it  is  completed,  where 
each  of  them  stake  their  characters  on  the  advice  or  vote 
they  give,  there  will  be  all  the  light  thrown  on  the  case, 
which  the  nature  and  circumstances  of  it  can  admit,  and 
any  corrupt  man  will  find  it  extremely  difficult  to  foist  in 
any  erroneous  clause  whatever;  and  every  ignorant  or  lazy 
man  will  find  the  strongest  inducements  to  make  himself 
master  of  the  subject,  that  he  may  appear  with  some  toler 
able  degree  of  character  in  it;  and  the  whole  will  find  them- 
selves in  a  manner  compelled,  diligently  and  sincerely  to 
seek  for  the  real  state  of  the  facts,  and  the  natural  fitness 
and  truths  arising  from  them,  i.  e.,  the  whole  natural  prin- 
ciples on  which  the  subjects  depend,  and  which  alone  can 
endure  every  test,  to  the  end  that  they  may  have  not  only 
the  inward  satisfaction  of  acting  properly  and  usefully  for 
the  States,  but  also  the  credit  and  character  which  is  or 
ought  ever  to  be  annexed  to  such  a  conduct. 

This  will  give  the  great  laws  of  Congress  the  highest  prob- 
ability, presumption,  and  means  of  right,  fitness,  and  truth, 
that  any  laws  whatever  can  have  at  their  first  enaction  and 
will  of  course  afford  the  highest  reason  for  the  confidence 
and  acquiescence  of  the  States,  and  all  their  subjects,  in 
them ;  and  being  grounded  in  truth  and  natural  fitness,  their 
operations  will  be  easy,  salutary,  and  satisfactory. 


38 

If  experience  shall  discover  error  in  any  law  (for  practise 
will  certainly  discover  such  errors,  if  there  be  any)  the 
legislature  will  always  be  able  to  correct  them,  by  such 
repeals,  amendments,  or  new  laws  as  shall  be  found  neces- 
sary ;  but  as  it  is  much  easier  to  prevent  mischiefs  than  to 
remedy  them,  all  possible  caution,  prudence,  and  attention 
should  be  sued,  to  make  the  laws  right  at  first. 

4.  There  is  another  body  of  men  among  us,  whose  busi- 
ness of  life,  and  whose  full  and  extensive  intelligence,  for- 
eign and  domestic,  naturally  make  them  more  perfectly 
acquainted  with  the  sources  of  our  wealth,  and  whose  par- 
ticular interests  are  more  intimately  and  necessarily  con- 
nected with  the  general  prosperity  of  the  country,  than  any 
other  order  of  men  in  the  States.  I  mean  the  Merchants ; 
and  I  could  wish  that  Congress  might  have  the  benefit  of 
that  extensive  and  important  information,  which  this  body 
of  men  are  very  capable  of  laying  before  them. 

Trade  is  of  such  essential  importance  to  our  interests,  and 
so  intimately  connected  with  all  our  staples,  great  and  small, 
that  no  sources  of  our  wealth  can  flourish,  and  operate  to 
the  general  benefit  of  the  community,  without  it.  Our  hus- 
bandry, that  great  staple  of  our  country,  can  never  exceed 
our  home  consumption  without  this — it  is  plain  at  first 
sight,  that  the  farmer  will  not  toil  and  sweat  through  the 
year  to  raise  great  plenty  of  the  produce  of  the  soil,  if  there 
is  no  market  for  his  produce,  when  he  has  it  ready  for  sale, 
i.  e.,  if  there  are  no  merchants  to  buy  it. 

In  like  manner,  the  manufacturer  will  not  lay  out  his 
business  on  any  large  scale,  if  there  is  no  merchant  to  buy 
his  fabrics  when  he  has  finished  them ;  a  vent  is  of  the  most 
essential  importance  to  ever}'  manufacturing  country — the 
merchants,  therefore,  become  the  natural  negotiators  of  the 
wealth  of  the  country,  who  take  off  the  abundance,  and  sup- 
ply the  wants,  of  the  inhabitants ; — and  as  this  negotiation 
is  the  business  of  their  lives,  and  the  source  of  their  own 
wealth,  they  of  course  become  better  acquainted  with  both 
our  abundance  and  wants,  and  are  more  interested  in  finding 
and  improving  the  best  vent  for  the  one,  and  supply  of  the 
other,  than  any  other  men  among  us,  and  they  have  a  natural 
interest  in  making  both  the  purchase  and  supply  as  conven- 
ient to  their  customers  as  possible,  that  they  may  secure 
their  custom,  and  thereby  increase  their  own  business. 


39 

It  follows  then,  that  the  merchants  are  not  only  qualified 
to  give  the  fullest  and  most  important  information  to  our 
supreme  legislature,  concerning  the  state  of  our  trade — the 
abundance  and  wants — the  wealth  and  poverty,  of  our  people, 
i.  e.,  their  most  important  interests,  but  are  also  the  most 
likely  to  do  it  fairly  and  truly,  and  to  forward  with  their  influ- 
ence, every  measure  which  will  operate  to  the  convenience 
and  benefit  of  our  commerce,  and  oppose  with  their  whole 
weight  and  superior  knowledge  of  the  subject,  any  wild 
schemes,  which  an  ignorant  or  arbitrary  legislature  may 
attempt  to  introduce,  to  the  hurt  and  embarrasment  of  our 
intercourse  both  with  one  another,  and  with  foreigners. 

The  States  of  Venice  and  Holland  have  ever  been  governed 
by  merchants,  or  at  least  their  policy  has  ever  been  under 
the  great  influence  of  that  sort  of  men.  No  States  have  been 
better  served,  as  appears  by  their  great  success,  the  ease  and 
happiness  of  their  citizens,  as  well  as  the  strength  and  riches 
of  their  Commonwealths :  the  one  is  the  oldest,  and  the  other 
the  richest,  State  in  the  world  of  equal  number  of  people — 
the  one  has  maintained  sundry  wars  with  the  Grand 
Turk — the  other  has  withstood  the  power  of  Spain  and 
France ;  and  the  capitals  of  both  have  long  been  the  princi- 
pal marts  of  the  several  parts  of  Europe  in  which  they  are 
situated ;  and  the  banks  of  both  are  the  best  supported,  and 
in  the  best  credit,  of  any  banks  in  Europe,  though  their 
countries  or  territories  are  very  small,  and  their  inhabitants 
but  a  handful,  when  compared  with  the  great  States  in  their 
neighbourhood. 

Merchants  must,  from  the  nature  of  Jieir business,  certainly 
understand  the  interests  and  resources  of  their  country,  the 
best  of  any  men  in  it ;  and  I  know  not  of  any  one  reason 
why  they  should  be  deemed  less  upright  or  patriotic,  than 
any  other  rank  of  citizen  whatever. 

I  therefore  humbly  propose,  if  the  merchants  in  the  several 
States  are  disposed  to  send  delegates  from  their  body,  to  meet 
and  attend  the  sitting  of  Congress,  that  they  shall  be  per- 
mitted to  form  a  chamber  of  commerce,  and  their  advice  to 
Congress  be  demanded  and  admitted  concerning  all  bills 
before  Congress,  as  far  as  the  same  may  affect  the  trade  of 
the  States. 

I  have  no  idea  that  the  continent  is  made  for  Congress :  I 
take  them  to  be  no  more  than  the  upper  servants  of  the  great 


40 

political  body,  who  are  to  find  out  things  by  study  and  inquiry 
as  other  people  do ;  and  therefore  I  think  it  necessary  to  place 
them  under  the  best  possible  advantages  for  information,  and 
to  require  them  to  improve  all  those  advantages,  to  qualify 
themselves  in  the  best  manner  possible,  for  the  wise  and 
useful  discharge  of  the  vast  trust  and  mighty  authority 
reposed  in  them ;  and  as  I  conceive  the  advice  of  the  mer- 
chants to  be  one  of  the  greatest  sources  of  mercantile  infor- 
mation, which  is  anywhere  placed  within  their  reach,  it 
ought  by  no  means  to  be  neglected,  but  so  husbanded  and 
improved,  that  the  greatest  possible  advantages  may  be 
derived  from  it. 

Besides  this,  I  have  another  reason  why  the  merchants 
ought  to  be  consulted ;  I  take  it  to  be  very  plain  that  the 
husbandry  and  manufactures  of  the  country  must  be  ruined, 
if  the  present  rate  of  taxes  is  continued  on  them  much  longer, 
and  of  course  a  very  great  part  of  our  revenue  must  arise 
from  imposts  on  merchandise,  which  will  fall  directly  within 
the  merchants'  sphere  of  business,  and  of  course  their  con- 
currence and  advice  will  be  of  the  utmost  consequence,  not 
only  to  direct  the  properest  mode  of  levying  those  duties, 
but  also  to  get  them  carried  into  quiet  and  peaceable  exe- 
cution. 

No  men  are  more  conversant  with  the  citizens,  or  more 
intimately  connected  with  their  interests,  than  the  merchants, 
and  therefore  their  weight  and  influence  will  have  a  mighty 
effect  on  the  minds  of  the  people.  I  do  not  recollect  an 
instance,  in  which  the  Court  of  London  ever  rejected  the 
remonstrances  and  advices  of  the  merchants,  and  did  not 
suffer  severely  for  their  pride.  We  have  some  striking 
instances  of  this  in  the  disregarded  advices  and  remonstrances 
of  very  many  English  merchants  against  the  American  war, 
and  their  fears  and  apprehensions  we  see  verified,  almost 
like  prophecies  by  the  event. 

I  know  not  why  I  should  continue  this  argument  any 
longer  or  indeed  why  I  should  have  urged  it  so  long,  in  as 
much  as  I  cannot  conceive  that  Congress  or  anybody  else 
will  deem  it  below  the  dignity  of  the  supreme  power  to  con- 
sult so  important  an  order  of  men,  in  matters  of  the  first 
consequence,  which  fall  immediately  under  their  notice,  and 
in  which  their  experience,  and  of  course  their  knowledge  and 
advice,  are  preferable  to  those  of  any  other  order  of  men. 


4i 

Besides  the  benefits  which  Congress  may  receive  from  this 
institution,  a  chamber  of  commerce,  composed  of  members 
from  all  trading  towns  in  the  States,  if  properly  instituted 
and  conducted,  will  produce  very  many,  I  might  almost 
say,  innumerable  advantages  of  singular  utility  to  all  the 
States — it  will  give  dignity,  uniformity,  and  safety  to  our 
trade — establish  the  credit  of  the  bank — secure  the  confidence 
of  foreign  merchants — prove  in  very  many  instances  a  fruit- 
ful source  of  improvement  of  our  staples  and  mutual  inter- 
course— correct  many  abuses — pacify  discontents — unite  us 
in  our  interests,  and  thereby  cement  the  general  union  of 
the  whole  Commonwealth — will  relieve  Congress  from  the 
pain  and  trouble  of  deciding  many  intricate  questions  of  trade 
which  they  do  not  understand,  by  referring  them  over  to 
this  chamber,  where  they  will  be  discussed  by  an  order  of 
men,  the  most  competent  to  the  business  of  any  that  can  be 
found,  and  most  likely  to  give  a  decision  that  shall  be  just, 
useful,  and  satisfactory. 

It  may  be  objected  to  all  this,  that  the  less  complex  and 
the  more  simple  every  constitution  is,  the  nearer  it  comes  to 
perfection :  this  argument  would  be  very  good,  and  afford  a 
very  forcible  conclusion,  if  the  government  of  men  was  like 
that  of  the  Almighty,  always  founded  on  wisdom,  knowledge 
and  truth;  but  in  the  present  imperfect  state  of  human 
nature,  where  the  best  of  men  know  but  in  part,  and  must 
recur  to  advice  and  information  for  the  rest,  it  certainly 
becomes  necessary  to  form  a  constitution  on  such  principles, 
as  will  secure  that  information  and  advice  in  the  best  and 
surest  manner  possible. 

It  may  be  further  objected  that  the  forms  herein  proposed 
will  embarrass  the  business  of  Congress,  and  make  it  at 
best  slow  and  dilatory.  As  far  as  this  form  will  prevent  the 
hurrying  a  bill  through  the  house  without  due  examination, 
the  objection  itself  becomes  an  advantage — at  most  these 
checks  on  the  supreme  authority  can  have  no  further  effect 
than  to  delay  or  destroy  a  good  bill,  but  cannot  pass  a  bad 
one;  and  I  think  it  much  better  in  the  main,  to  lose  a  good 
bill  than  to  suffer  a  bad  one  to  pass  into  a  law. — Besides  it 
is  not  to  be  supposed  that  clear,  plain  cases  will  meet  with 
embarrassment,  and  it  is  most  safe  that  untried,  doubtful, 
difficult  matters  should  pass  through  the  gravest  and  fullest 
discussion,  before  the  sanction  of  the  law  is  given  to  them. 


42 

But  what  is  to  be  done  if  the  two  houses  grow  jealous  and 
ill-natured,  and  after  all  their  information  and  advice,  grow 
out  of  humor  and  insincere,  and  no  concurrence  can  be 
obtained?  I  answer,  sit  still  and  do  nothing  until  they  get 
into  a  better  humor:  I  think  this  is  much  better  than  to  pass 
laws  in  such  a  temper  and  spirit,  as  the  objection  supposes. 

It  is  however  an  ill  compliment  to  so  many  grave  person- 
ages, to  suppose  them  capable  of  throwing  aside  their  reason, 
and  giving  themselves  up  like  children  to  the  control  of  their 
passions;  or,  if  this  should  happen  for  a  moment,  that  it 
should  continue  any  length  of  time,  is  hardly  to  be  presumed 
of  a  body  of  men  placed  in  such  high  stations  of  dignity  and 
importance,  with  the  eyes  of  all  the  world  upon  them — but 
if  they  should,  after  all,  be  capable  of  this,  I  think  it  mad- 
ness to  set  them  to  making  laws,  during  such  fits — it  is  best, 
when  they  are  in  no  condition  to  do  good,  to  keep  them  from 
doing  hurt — and  if  they  do  not  grow  wiser  in  reasonable 
time,  I  know  of  nothing  better,  than  to  be  ashamed  of  our  old 
appointments,  and  make  new  ones. 

But  what  if  the  country  is  invaded,  or  some  other  exigency 
happens,  so  pressing  that  the  safety  of  the  State  requires  an 
immediate  resolution  ?  I  answer,  what  would  you  do  if  such 
a  case  should  happen,  where  there  was  but  one  house, 
unchecked,  but  equally  divided,  so  that  a  legal  vote  could  not 
be  obtained.  The  matter  is  certainly  equally  difficult  and 
embarrassed  in  both  cases :  but  in  the  case  proposed  I  know 
of  no  better  way  than  that  which  the  Romans  adopted  on  the 
like  occasion,  viz.,  that  both  houses  meet  in  one  chamber, 
and  choose  a  dictator,  who  should  have  and  exercise  the 
whole  power  of  both  houses,  till  such  time  as  they  should  be 
able  to  concur  in  displacing  him,  and  that  the  whole  power 
of  the  two  houses  should  be  suspended  in  the  meantime. 

5.  I  further  propose,  that  no  grant  of  money  whatever 
shall  be  made,  without  an  appropriation,  and  that  rigid  pen- 
alties (no  matter  how  great,  in  my  opinion  the  halter  would 
be  mild  enough)  shall  be  inflicted  on  any  person,  however 
august  his  station,  who  should  give  order,  or  vote  for  the 
payment,  or  actually  pay  one  shilling  of  such  money  to  any 
other  purpose  than  that  of  its  appropriation,  and  that  no 
order  whatever  of  any  superior  in  office  shall  justify  such 
payment,  but  every  order  shall  express  what  funds  it  is 
drawn  upon,  and  what  appropriation  it  is  to  be  charged  to,  or 
the  order  shall  not  be  paid. 


43 

This  kind  of  embezzlement  is  of  so  fatal  a  nature,  that  no 
measures  or  bounds  are  to  be  observed  in  curing  it ;  when 
ministers  will  set  forth  the  most  specious  and  necessary  occa- 
sions for  money,  and  induce  the  people  to  pay  it  in  full  tale ; 
and  when  they  have  gotten  possession  of  it,  to  neglect  the 
great  objects  for  which  it  was  given,  and  pay  it,  sometimes 
squander  it  away,  for  different  purposes,  oftentimes  for  use- 
less, yea,  hurtful  ones,  yea,  often  even  to  bribe  and  corrupt 
the  very  officers  of  government,  to  betray  their  trust,  and 
contaminate  the  State,  even  in  its  public  offices — to  force 
people  to  buy  their  own  destruction,  and  pay  for  it  with  their 
hard  labor,  the  very  sweat  of  their  brow,  is  a  crime  of  so 
high  a  nature,  that  I  know  not  any  gibbet  too  cruel  for  such 
offenders. 

6.  I  would  further  propose,  that  the  aforesaid  great  minis- 
ters of  state  shall  compose  a  Council  of  State,  to  whose  number 
Congress  may  add  three  others,  viz,  one  from  New  England, 
one  from  the  middle  States,  and  one  from  the  southern  States, 
one  of  which  to  be  appointed  President  by  Congress ;  to  all 
of  whom  shall  be  committed  the  supreme  executive  authority 
of  the  States  (all  and  singular  of  them  ever  accountable  to 
Congress)  who  shall  superintend  all  the  executive  depart- 
ments, and  appoint  all  executive  officers,  who  shall  ever  be 
accountable  to,  and  removable  for  just  cause  by,  them  or 
Congress,  i.  <?.,  either  of  them. 

7.  I  propose  further,  that  the  powers  of  Congress,  and  all 
the  other  departments,  acting  under  them,  shall  all  be  re- 
stricted to  such  matters  only  of  general  necessity  and  utility 
to  all  the  States,  as  cannot  come  within  the  jurisdiction  of 
any  particular  State,  or  to  which  the  authority  of  any  par- 
ticular State  is  not  competent:  so  that  each  particular  State 
shall  enjoy  all  sovereignty  and  supreme  authority  to  all 
intents  and  purposes,  excepting  only  those  high  authorities 
and  powers  by  them  delegated  to  Congress,  for  the  purposes 
of  the  general  union. 

There  remains  one  very  important  article  still  to  be  dis- 
cussed, viz,  what  methods  the  Constitution  shall  point  out, 
to  enforce  the  acts  and  requisitions  of  Congress  through  the 
several  States;  and  how  the  States  which  refuse  or  delay 
obedience  to  such  acts  and  requisitions,  shall  be  treated:  this, 
I  know,  is  a  particular  of  the  greatest  delicacy,  as  well  as  of 
the  utmost  importance ;  and  therefore,  I  think,  ought  to  be 


44 

decidedly  settled  by  tlie  Constitution,  in  our  coolest  hours, 
whilst  no  passions  or  prejudices  exist,  which  may  be  excited 
by  the  great  interests  or  strong  circumstances  of  any  par- 
ticular case  which  may  happen. 

I  know  that  supreme  authorities  are  liable  to  err,  as  well  as 
subordinate  ones.  I  know  that  courts  may  be  in  the  wrong, 
as  well  as  the  people;  such  is  the  imperfect  state  of  human 
nature  in  all  ranks  and  degrees  of  men ;  but  we  must  take 
human  nature  as  it  is;  it  cannot  be  mended;  and  we  are 
compelled  both  by  wisdom  and  necessity,  to  adopt  such 
methods  as  promise  the  greatest  attainable  good,  though  per- 
haps not  the  greatest  possible,  and  such  as  are  liable  to  the 
fewest  inconveniences,  though  not  altogether  free  of  them. 

This  is  a  question  of  such  magnitude,  that  I  think  it 
necessary  to  premise  the  great  natural  principles  on  which 
its  decision  ought  to  depend — In  the  present  state  of  human 
nature,  all  human  life  is  a  life  of  chances;  it  is  impossible 
to  make  any  interest  so  certain,  but  there  will  be  a  chance 
against  it ;  and  we  are  in  all  cases  obliged  to  adopt  a  chance 
against  us,  in  order  to  bring  ourselves  within  the  benefit  of  a 
greater  chance  in  our  favor ;  and  that  calculation  of  chances 
which  is  grounded  on  the  great  natural  principles  of  truth 
and  fitness,  is  of  all  others  the  most  likely  to  come  out  right. 

i.  No  laws  of  any  State  whatever,  which  do  not  carry  in 
them  a  force  which  extends  to  their  effectual  and  final 
execution,  can  afford  a  certain  or  sufficient  security  to  the 
subject:  this  is  too  plain  to  need  any  proof. 

2.  Laws  or  ordinances  of  any  kind  (especially  of  august 
bodies  of  high  dignity  and  consequence),  which  fail  of  execu- 
tion are  much  worse  than  none;  they  weaken  the  govern- 
ment; expose  it  to  contempt;  destroy  the  confidence  of  all 
men,  natives  and  foreigners,  in  it;  and  expose  both  aggregate 
bodies  and  individuals,  who  have  placed  confidence  in  it,  to 
many  ruinous  disappointments,  which  they  would  have 
escaped,  had  no  law  or  ordinance  been  made :  therefore, 

3.  To  appoint  a  Congress  with  powers  to  do  all  acts  neces- 
sary for  the  support  and  uses  of  the  union ;  and  at  the  same 
time  to  leave  all  the  States  at  liberty  to  obey  them  or  not 
with  impunity,  is,  in  every  view,  the  grossest  absurdity, 
worse  than  a  state  of  nature  without  any  supreme  authority 
at  all,  and  at  best  a  ridiculous  effort  of  childish  nonsense: 
and  of  course, 


45 

4.  Every  State  in  the  Union  is  under  the  highest  obligation 
to  obey  the  supreme  authority  of  the  whole,  and  in  the  highest 
degree  amenable  to  it,  and  subject  to  the  highest  censure  for 
disobedience — Yet  all  this  notwithstanding,  I  think  the  soul 
that  sins  shall  die,  i.  <e\,  the  censure  of  the  great  supreme 
power,  ought  to  be  so  directed,  if  possible,  as  to  light  on  those 
persons,  who  have  betrayed  their  country,  and  exposed  it  to 
dissolution,  by  opposing  and  rejecting  that  supreme  authority, 
which  is  the  band  of  our  union,  and  from  whence  proceeds 
the  principal  strength  and  energy  of  our  government. 

I  therefore  propose,  that  every  person  whatever,  whether 
in  public  or  private  character,  who  shall,  by  public  vote  or 
overt  act,  disobey  the  supreme  authority,  shall  be  amenable 
to  Congress,  shall  be  summoned  and  compelled  to  appear 
before  Congress,  and,  on  due  conviction,  suffer  such  fine, 
imprisonment,  or  other  punishment,  as  the  supreme  authority 
shall  judge  requisite. 

It  may  be  objected  here,  that  this  will  make  a  Member  of 
Assembly  accountable  to  Congress  for  his  vote  in  Assembly; 
I  answer,  it  does  so  in  this  only  case,  viz.,  when  that  vote  is 
to  disobey  the  supreme  authority;  no  Member  of  Assembly 
can  have  right  to  give  such  a  vote,  and  therefore  ought  to  be 
punished  for  so  doing — When  the  supreme  authority  is  dis- 
obeyed, the  government  must  lose  its  energy  and  effect,  and 
of  course  the  Bmpire  must  be  shaken  to  its  very  foundation. 

A  government  which  is  but  half  executed,  or  whose  opera- 
tions may  all  be  stopped  by  a  single  vote,  is  the  most  danger- 
ous of  all  institutions. — See  the  present  Poland,  and  ancient 
Greece  buried  in  ruins,  in  consequence  of  this  fatal  error  in 
their  policy.  A  government  which  has  not  energy  and  effect, 
can  never  afford  protection  or  security  to  its  subjects,  i.  e., 
must  ever  be  ineffectual  to  its  own  ends. 

I  cannot  therefore  admit,  that  the  great  ends  of  our  Union 
should  lie  at  the  mercy  of  a  single  State,  or  that  the  energy 
of  our  government  should  be  checked  by  a  single  disobedi- 
ence, or  that  such  disobedience  should  ever  be  sheltered  from 
censure  and  punishment;  the  consequences  is  too  capital,  too 
fatal  to  be  admitted.  Even  though  I  know  very  well  that  a 
supreme  authority,  with  all  its  dignity  and  importance,  is 
subject  to  passions  like  other  lesser  powers,  that  they  may 
be  and  often  are  heated,  violent,  oppressive,  and  very  tyran- 
nical; yet  I  know  also,  that  perfection  is  not  to  be  hoped  for 


46 

in  this  life,  and  we  must  take  all  institutions  with  their  nat- 
ural defects,  or  reject  them  altogether:  I  will  guard  against 
these  abuses  of  power  as  far  as  possible,  but  I  cannot  give 
up  all  government,  or  destroy  its  necessary  energy,  for  fear 
of  these  abuses. 

But  to  fence  them  out  as  far  as  possible,  and  to  give  the 
States  as  great  a  check  on  the  supreme  authority,  as  can 
consist  with  its  necessary  energy  and  effect, 

I  propose  that  any  State  may  petition  Congress  to  repeal 
any  law  or  decision  which  they  have  made,  and  if  more  than 
half  the  States  do  this,  the  law  or  decision  shall  be  repealed, 
let  its  nature  or  importance  be  however  great,  excepting 
only  such  acts  as  create  funds  for  the  public  credit,  which 
shall  never  be  repealed  till  their  end  is  effected,  or  other 
funds  equally  effectual  are  substituted  in  their  place;  but 
Congress  shall  not  be  obliged  to  repeal  any  of  these  acts,  so 
petitioned  against,  till  they  have  time  to  lay  the  reasons  of 
such  acts  before  such  petitioning  States,  and  to  receive  their 
answer ;  because  such  petitions  may  arise  from  sudden  heats, 
popular  prejudices,  or  the  publication  of  matters  false  in 
fact,  and  may  require  time  and  means  of  cool  reflection  and 
the  fullest  information,  before  the  final  decision  is  made: 
but  if  after  all  more  than  half  of  the  States  persist  in  their 
demand  of  a  repeal,  it  shall  take  place. 

The  reason  is,  the  uneasiness  of  a  majority  of  States 
affords  a  strong  presumption  that  the  act  is  wrong,  for 
uneasiness  arises  much  more  frequently  from  wrong  than 
right;  but  if  the  act  was  good  and  right,  it  would  still  be 
better .  to  repeal  and  lose  it,  than  to  force  the  execution  of  it 
against  the  opinion  of  a  major  part  of  the  States;  and 
lastly,  if  every  act  of  Congress  is  subject  to  this  repeal,  Con- 
gress itself  will  have  stronger  inducement  not  only  to  exam- 
ine well  the  several  acts  under  their  consideration,  but  also 
to  communicate  the  reasons  of  them  to  the  States,  than  they 
would  have  if  their  simple  vote  gave  the  final  stamp  of  irre- 
vocable authority  to  their  acts. 

Further  I  propose,  that  if  the  execution  of  any  act  or  order 
of  the  supreme  authority  shall  be  opposed  by  force  in  any  of 
the  States  (which  God  forbid)  it  shall  be  lawful  for  Congress 
to  send  into  such  State  a  sufficient  force  to  suppress  it. 

On  the  whole,  I  take  it  that  the  very  existence  and  use  of 
our  union  essentially  depends  on  the  full  energy  and  final 


47 

effect  of  the  laws  made  to  support  it ;  and  therefore  I  sacrifice 
all  other  considerations  to  this  energy  and  effect,  and  if  our 
Union  is  not  worth  this  purchase,  we  must  give  it  up — the 
nature  of  the  thing  does  not  admit  of  any  other  alternative. 

I  do  contend  that  our  Union  is  worth  this  purchase — 
with  it,  every  individual  rests  secure  under  its  protection 
against  foreign  or  domestic  insult  and  oppression — without 
it,  we  can  have  no  security  against  the  oppression,  insult, 
and  invasion  of  foreign  powers;  for  no  single  State  is  of 
importance  enough  to  be  an  object  of  treaty  with  them, 
nor,  if  it  was,  could  it  bear  the  expense  of  such  treaties,  or 
support  any  character  or  respect  in  a  dissevered  state,  but 
must  lose  all  respectability  among  the  nations  abroad. 

We  have  a  very  extensive  trade,  which  cannot  be  carried 
on  with  security  and  advantage,  without  treaties  of  com- 
merce and  alliance  with  foreign  nations. 

We  have  an  extensive  western  territory  which  cannot 
otherwise  be  defended  against  the  invasion  of  foreign  nations, 
bordering  on  our  frontiers,  who  will  cover  it  with  their  own 
inhabitants,  and  we  shall  loose  it  forever,  and  our  extent  of 
empire  be  thereby  restrained;  and  what  is  worse,  their 
numerous  posterity  will  in  future  time  drive  ours  into  the 
sea,  as  the  Goths  and  Vandals  formerly  conquered  the 
Romans  in  like  circumstances,  unless  we  have  the  force 
of  the  union  to  repel  such  invasions.  We  have,  without 
the  union,  no  security  against  the  inroads  and  wars  of  one 
State  upon  another,  by  which  our  wealth  and  strength, 
as  well  as  ease  and  comfort,  will  be  devoured  by  enemies 
growing  out  of  our  own  bowels. 

I  conclude  then,  that  our  union  is  not  only  of  the  most 
essential  consequence  to  the  well-being  of  the  States  in 
general  but  to  that  of  every  individual  citizen  of  them,  and 
of  course  ought  to  be  supported,  and  made  as  useful  and 
safe  as  possible,  by  a  Constitution  which  admits  that  full 
energy  and  final  effect  of  government  which  alone  can  secure 
its  great  ends  and  uses. 

In  a  dissertation  of  this  sort,  I  would  not  wish  to  descend 
to  minutiae,  yet  there  are  some  small  matters  which  have 
important  consequences,  and  therefore  ought  to  be  noticed. 
It  is  necessary  that  Congress  should  have  all  usual  and 
necessary  powers  of  self-preservation  and  order,  e.  g.,  to 
imprison  for  contempt,  insult,  or  interruption,  etc.,  and  to 


48 

expel  their  own  members  for  due  causes,  among  which  I 
would  rank  that  of  non-attendance  on  the  house,  or  partial 
attendance  without  such  excuse  as  shall  satisfy  the  house. 

Where  there  is  such  vast  authority  and  trust  devolved 
on  Congress,  and  the  grand  and  most  important  interests 
of  the  Empire  rest  on  their  decisions,  it  appears  to  me 
highly  unreasonable  that  we  should  suffer  their  august 
consultations  to  be  suspended,  or  their  dignity,  authority, 
and  influence  lessened  by  the  idleness,  neglect,  and  non- 
attendance  of  its  members;  for  we  know  that  the  acts  of 
a  thin  house  do  not  usually  carry  with  them  the  same  degree 
of  weight  and  respect  as  those  of  a  full  house. 

Besides  I  think,  when  a  man  is  deputed  a  delegate  in 
Congress,  and  has  undertaken  the  business,  the  whole 
Bmpire  becomes  of  course  possessed  of  a  right  to  his  best 
and  constant  services,  which  if  any  member  refuses  or  neg- 
lects, the  Bmpire  is  injured  and  ought  to  resent  the  injury, 
at  least  so  far  as  to  expel  and  send  him  home,  that  so  his 
place  may  be  better  supplied. 

I  have  one  argument  in  favor  of  my  whole  plan,  viz, 
it  is  so  formed  that  no  men  of  dull  intellects,  or  small  knowl- 
edge, or  of  habits  too  idle  for  constant  attendance,  or  close 
and  steady  attention,  can  do  the  business  with  any  tolerable 
degree  of  respectability,  nor  can  they  find  either  honor, 
profit,  or  satisfaction  in  being  there,  and  of  course,  I  could 
wish  that  the  choice  of  the  electors  might  never  fall  on  such 
a  man,  or  if  it  should,  that  he  might  have  sense  enough  (of 
pain  at  least,  if  not  of  shame)  to  decline  his  acceptance. 

For  after  all  that  can  be  done,  I  do  not  think  that  a  good 
administration  depends  wholly  on  a  good  Constitution  and 
good  laws,  for  insufficient  or  bad  men  will  always  make  bad 
work,  and  a  bad  administration,  let  the  Constitution  and 
laws  be  ever  so  good ;  the  management  of  able,  faithful,  and 
upright  men  alone  can  cause  an  administration  to  brighten, 
and  the  dignity  and  wisdom  of  an  Empire  to  rise  into  respect ; 
make  truth  the  line  and  measure  of  public  decision;  give 
weight  and  authority  to  the  government,  and  security  and 
peace  to  the  subject. 

We  now  hope  that  we  are  on  the  close  of  a  war  of  mighty 
effort  and  great  distress,  against  the  greatest  power  on  earth, 
whetted  into  the  most  keen  resentment  and  savage  fierceness, 
which  can  be  excited  by  wounded  pride,  and  which  usually 


49 

rises  higher  between  brother  and  brother  offended,  than 
between  strangers  in  contest.  Twelve  of  the  Thirteen  United 
States  have  felt  the  actnal  and  cruel  invasions  of  the  enemy, 
and  eleven  of  our  capitals  have  been  under  their  power,  first 
or  last,  during  the  dreadful  conflict ;  but  a  good  Providence, 
our  own  virtue  and  firmness,  and  the  help  of  our  friends,  have 
enabled  us  to  rise  superior  to  all  the  power  of  our  adversaries, 
and  made  them  seek  to  be  at  peace  with  us. 

During  the  extreme  pressures  of  the  war,  indeed  many 
errors  in  our  administration  have  been  committed,  when  we 
could  not  have  experience  and  time  for  reflection,  to  make 
us  wise ;  but  these  will  easily  be  excused,  forgiven,  and  for- 
gotten, if  we  can  now,  while  at  leisure,  find  virtue,  wisdom, 
and  foresight  enough  to  correct  them,  and  form  such  estab- 
lishments, as  shall  secure  the  great  ends  of  our  union,  and 
give  dignity,  force,  utility,  and  permanency  to  our  Bmpire. 

It  is  a  pity  we  should  lose  the  honor  and  blessings  which 
have  cost  us  so  dear,  for  want  of  wisdom  and  firmness,  in 
measures,  which  are  essential  to  our  preservation.  It  is  now 
at  our  option,  either  to  fall  back  into  our  original  atoms,  or 
form  such  an  union,  as  shall  command  the  respect  of  the 
world,  and  give  honor  and  security  to  our  people. 

This  vast  subject  lies  with  mighty  weight  on  my  mind, 
and  I  have  bestowed  on  it  my  utmost  attention,  and  here 
offer  the  public  the  best  thoughts  and  sentiments  I  am 
master  of.  I  have  confined  myself  in  this  dissertation  en- 
tirely to  the  nature,  reason,  and  truth  of  my  subject,  without 
once  adverting  to  the  reception  it  might  meet  with  from  men 
of  different  prejudices  or  interests.  To  find  the  truth,  not 
to  carry  a  point,  has  been  my  object. 

I  have  not  the  vanity  to  imagine  that  my  sentiments  may 
be  adopted;  I  shall  have  all  the  reward  I  wish  or  expect,  if 
my  dissertation  shall  throw  any  light  on  the  great  subject, 
shall  excite  an  emulation  of  inquiry,  and  animate  some  abler 
genius  to  form  a  plan  of  greater  perfection,  less  objectionable, 
and  more  useful. 


NOTES  APPENDED  BY  PELATIAH  WEBSTER  TO  THE  REPUB- 
LICATION MADE  AT  PHILADELPHIA  IN  1791. 

NOTE   I. 

i .  Forming  a  plan  of  confederation,  or  a  system  of  general 
government  of  the  United  States,  engrossed  the  attention  of 
Congress  from  the  declaration  of  independence,  July  4,  1776, 
till  the  same  was  completed  by  Congress,  July  9,  1778,  and 
recommended  to  the  several  States  for  ratification,  which 
finally  took  place,  March  1,  1781 ;  from  which  time  the  said 
confederation  was  considered  as  the  grand  constitution  of  the 
general  government,  and  the  whole  administration  was  con- 
formed to  it. 

And  as  it  had  stood  the  test  of  discussion  in  Congress  for 
two  years,  before  they  completed  and  adopted  it,  and  in  all 
the  States  for  three  years  more,  before  it  was  finally  ratified, 
one  would  have  thought  that  it  must  have  been  a  very  fin- 
ished and  perfect  plan  of  government. 

But  on  trial  of  it  in  practice,  it  was  found  to  be  extremely 
weak,  defective,  totally  inefficient,  and  altogether  inadequate 
to  its  great  ends  and  purposes.     For, 

1.  It  blended  the  legislative  and  executive  powers  together 
in  one  body. 

2.  This  body,  viz,  Congress,  consisted  of  but  one  house, 
without  any  check  upon  their  resolutions. 

3.  The  powers  of  Congress  in  very  few  instances  were 
definitive  and  final ;  in  the  most  important  articles  of  govern- 
ment they  could  do  no  more  than  recommend  to  the  several 
States ;  the  consent  of  every  one  of  which  was  necessary  to 
give  legal  sanction  to  any  act  so  recommended. 

4.  They  could  assess  and  levy  no  taxes. 

5.  They  could  institute  and  execute  no  punishments, 
except  in  the  military  department. 

6.  They  had  no  power  of  deciding  or  controlling  the  con- 
tentions and  disputes  of  different  States  with  each  other. 

7.  They  could  not  regulate  the  general  trade :  or, 

(50) 


5i 

8.  Bven  make  laws  to  secure  either  public  treaties  with 
foreign  States,  or  the  persons  of  public  ambassadors,  or  to 
punish  violations  or  injuries  done  to  either  of  them. 

9.  They  could  institute  no  general  judiciary  powers. 

10.  They  could  regulate  no  public  roads,  canals,  or  inland 
navigation,  etc.,  etc.,  etc. 

And  what  caps  all  the  rest  was,  that  (whilst  under  such  an 
inefficient  political  constitution,  the  only  chance  we  had  of 
any  tolerable  administration  lay  wholly  in  the  prudence  and 
wisdom  of  the  men  who  happened  to  take  the  lead  in  our 
public  councils)  it  was  fatally  provided  by  the  absurd  doctrine 
of  rotation,  that  if  any  Member  of  Congress  by  three  years' 
experience  and  application,  had  qualified  himself  to  manage 
our  public  affairs  with  consistency  and  fitness,  that  he  should 
be  constitutionally  and  absolutely  rendered  incapable  of 
serving  any  longer,  till  by  three  years'  discontinuance,  he 
had  pretty  well  lost  the  cue  or  train  of  the  public  counsels, 
and  forgot  the  ideas  and  plans  which  made  his  service  useful 
and  important;  and,  in  the  mean  time,  his  place  should  be 
supplied  by  a  fresh  man,  who  had  the  whole  matter  to  learn, 
and  when  he  had  learned  it,  was  to  give  place  to  another 
fresh  man ;  and  so  on  to  the  end  of  the  chapter. 

The  sensible  mind  of  the  United  States,  by  long  experience 
of  the  fatal  mischiefs  of  anarchy,  or  (which  is  about  the  same 
thing)  of  this  ridiculous,  inefficient  form  of  government, 
began  to  apprehend  that  there  was  something  wrong  in  our 
policy,  which  ought  to  be  redressed  and  mended ;  but  nobody 
undertook  to  delineate  the  necessary  amendments. 

I  was  then  pretty  much  at  leisure,  and  was  fully  of  opinion 
(though  the  sentiment  at  that  time  would  not  very  well  bear) 
that  it  would  be  ten  times  easier  to  form  a  new  constitution 
than  to  mend  the  old  one.  I  therefore  sat  myself  down  to 
sketch  out  the  leading  principles  of  that  political  constitu- 
tion, which  I  thought  necessary  to  the  preservation  and  hap- 
piness of  the  United  States  of  America,  which  are  comprised 
in  this  Dissertation. 

I  hope  the  reader  will  please  to  consider,  that  these  are 
the  original  thoughts  of  a  private  individual,  dictated  by  the 
nature  of  the  subject  only,  long  before  the  important  theme 
became  the  great  object  of  discussion,  in  the  most  dignified 
and  important  assembly,  which  ever  sat  or  decided  in  America. 


52 

Note  2. 

At  the  time  when  this  Dissertation  was  written  (Feb.  16, 
1783)  the  defects  and  insufficiency  of  the  Old  Federal  Con- 
stitution were  universally  felt  and  acknowledged;  it  was 
manifest,  not  only  that  the  internal  police,  justice,  security 
and  peace  of  the  States  could  never  be  preserved  under  it, 
but  the  finances  and  public  credit  would  necessarily  become 
so  embarrassed,  precarious,  and  void  of  support,  that  no 
public  movement,  which  depended  on  the  revenue,  could  be 
managed  with  any  effectual  certainty :  but  though  the  public 
mind  was  under  full  conviction  of  all  these  mischiefs,  and  was 
contemplating  a  remedy,  yet  the  public  ideas  were  not  at  all 
concentrated,  much  less  arranged  into  any  new  system  or 
form  of  government,  which  would  obviate  these  evils.  Under 
these  circumstances  I  offered  this  Dissertation  to  the  public : 
how  far  the  principles  of  it  were  adopted  or  rejected  in  the 
New  Constitution,  which  was  four  years  afterwards  (Sept. 
17,  1787)  formed  by  the  General  Convention,  and  since 
ratified  by  all  the  States,  is  obvious  to  every  one. 

I  wish  here  to  remark  the  great  particulars  of  my  plan 
which  were  rejected  by  the  Convention. 

1.  My  plan  was  to  keep  the  legislative  and  executive 
departments  entirely  distinct;  the  one  to  consist  of  the  two 
houses  of  Congress,  the  other  to  rest  entirely  in  the  Grand 
Council  of  State. 

2.  I  proposed  to  introduce  a  Chamber  of  Commerce,  to 
consist  of  merchants,  who  should  be  consulted  by  the  legis- 
lature in  all  matters  of  trade  and  revenue,  and  which  should 
have  the  conducting  the  revenue  committed  to  them. 

The  first  of  these  the  Convention  qualified;  the  second 
they  say  nothing  of,  i.  e.,  take  no  notice  of  it. 

3.  I  proposed  that  the  great  officers  of  state  should  have 
the  perusal  of  all  bills,  before  they  were  enacted  into  laws, 
and  should  be  required  to  give  their  opinion  of  them,  as  far 
as  they  affected  the  public  interest  in  their  several  depart- 
ments; which  report  of  them  Congress  should  cause  to  be 
read  in  their  respective  houses,  and  entered  on  their  minutes. 
This  is  passed  over  without  notice. 

4.  I  proposed  that  all  public  officers  appointed  by  the 
executive  authority,  should  be  amenable  both  to  them  and 


53 

to  the  legislative  power,  and  removable  for  just  cause  by 
either  of  them.     This  is  qualified  by  the  Convention. 

And  in  as  much  as  my  sentiments  in  these  respects  were 
either  qualified  or  totally  neglected  by  the  Convention,  I 
suppose  they  were  wrong ;  however,  the  whole  matter  is  sub- 
mitted to  the  politicians  of  the  present  age,  and  to  our  pos- 
terity in  future. 

In  sundry  other  things,  the  Convention  have  gone  into 
minutiae,  e.  g:,  respecting  elections  of  President,  Senators, 
and  Representatives  in  Congress,  etc.,  which  I  proposed  to 
leave  at  large  to  the  wisdom  and  discretion  of  Congress,  and 
of  the  several  States. 

Great  reasons  may  doubtless  be  assigned  for  their  decision, 
and  perhaps  some  little  ones  for  mine.  Time,  the  great 
arbiter  of  all  human  plans,  may,  after  a  while,  give  his 
decision ;  but  neither  the  Convention  nor  myself  will  prob- 
ably live  to  feel  either  the  exultation  or  mortification  of  his 
approbation  or  disapprobation  of  either  of  our  plans. 

But  if  any  of  these  questions  should  in  future  time  become 
objects  of  discussion,  neither  the  vast  dignity  of  the  Conven- 
tion, nor  the  low,  unnoticed  state  of  myself,  will  be  at  all 
considered  in  the  debates ;  the  merits  of  the  matter,  and  the 
interests  connected  with  or  arising  out  of  it,  will  alone  dictate 
the  decision. 


/  OF  Tl 

UNIVERb, 

OF 

^.i-'FORNVh, 


UNIVEESITY  OF  CALIFOENIA  LIBEAEY, 
BEEKELEY 


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